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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
URUGUAY ROUND - NEGOTIATING




On June 16, 1989, the following commentary was published in a
leading German newspaper:'
Everyone a Benefactor
Is it not striking, how cheeky and bold Brussels and Washington sell
their most questionable and protectionist measures as nothing but benev-
olence and loving care for a liberal world trading system? The United
States, at least according to Carla Hills, never thinks of anything but the
wealth and prosperity of the others. After all, its new trade instrument
"Super 301" serves exclusively to open up markets, with the crowbar if it
need be. And as Jacques Delors tried to sell in Washington recently, the
European Community's restrictive local content rules - for example for
cars made in the U.S. by Japanese manufacturers - are aiming only at
improving employment and economic growth in the United States.
Surely a similar altruistic claim by the Japanese in justification of their
numerous trade restrictions is already waiting in the wings to complete
this concert of bigotry. But in the face of all this charity, is it not incom-
prehensible why the multilateral GATT negotiations seem paralyzed and
the larger newly industrialized and developing nations are so suspicious
in international trade matters? For some reason nobody seems to believe
all these benefactors.
Are the current negotiations on Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights ("TRIPS") in the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") just another facet of the
old North-South conflict? Or is there something new and different
hiding behind the those magic letters, "TRIPS"? Negotiations in the
Uruguay Round began in 1986 and the literature written on them by
lawyers and economists already fills entire libraries. Intellectual prop-
erty ("IP"), while only one of fifteen topics on the agenda, is one of the
most intensively covered areas.
* LL.M., University of Michigan, 1990.
1. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 19, 1989, at 13 (translation by the author).
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Although "intellectual property" is not at all a new concept, it is
still a strange and unfamiliar notion to most. In effect IP is a legal
construct allowing a natural or legal person to "own" knowledge, with
ownership being defined more or less in the terms of the German
Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch: the owner of an asset is entitled to deal with
it in any lawful way and to exclude others from using the asset.
2
Unlimited ownership of the "classic" tangible assets is the most
fundamental tenet of our society, even the "lawful use" of many
things, particularly real property, is becoming increasingly regulated.
Similarly, we have long become used to more modem tangible assets
like promissory notes, checks and other commercial papers. By con-
trast, the existence and value of intangible assets, as exemplified by
court awards of compensatory damages for infringement of the good-
will of an enterprise, will seem rather bizarre to most non-lawyers.
Knowledge, however, is even more unique. It has been called "the
ultimate intangible asset."' 3 While it is frequently costly to create
knowledge, once in existence it can be multiplied and possesed by
many at practically no additional cost. The creator can transfer it lib-
erally and still retain full use of it. Additional inventiveness and crea-
tivity (and therefore knowledge) is encouraged when as many users as
possible have access to the existing knowledge. This, and the fact that
most existing knowledge was and is being created by the Western in-
dustrialized countries (WICS), explains why many developing coun-
tries demand that knowledge should be treated as a "common heritage
of mankind" 4 and made available free of charge to all nations, partly
but not only as an act of developmental aid.
However, the creator of a certain piece of knowledge usually must
invest large amounts of time and money to generate this knowledge
and develop it to the point of economic usefulness. In addition, there
is never a guarantee that a particular inventive effort will be successful.
Even if something new is discovered, only one out of ten inventions
proves to be economically exploitable, 5 and of course nobody knows
which in advance. Continuing inventive activity thus depends on the
likelihood of recouping this start-up cost as well as earning a substan-
tial profit to compensate for the risk and the failures.
2. See BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 903, as amended.
3. Reidenberg, Information Property: Some Intellectual Property Aspects of the Global Infor-
mation Economy, 10 INFORMATION AGE, Jan. 1988, at 3.
4. R. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 28 (1987).
5. MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, The Economic Significance of Piracy, in INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 89, 100-01 (R. Gadbaw
and T. Richards eds. 1988)
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There are three fundamentally different approaches to the problem
of providing incentives for inventive activity. First, the inventor may
be employed and/or paid by the state (the concept of the socialist non-
market economies). Second, the problem. may be left to the forces of
the free market and self-protection. Here it is up to the innovator to
protect his knowledge (by secrecy in trade) as long as possible and try
its exploitation before imitators catch up. Once competitors obtain the
knowledge, they are able to undersell the innovator because they will
not have to incur the start-up costs of product research and market
development. This free-market concept is embraced by some states for
certain areas of commercial activities not otherwise protected by the
state's legal regime. Finally, the inventor could be granted the exclu-
sive right by the state to exploit the invention for a certain time in
exchange for disclosing it to the public. This policy is adhered to by
the Western industrialized countries ("WICS") for most areas of com-
mercial activities, and by most developing nations for certain areas of
commercial activities.
The WICs claim that their system is the most efficient and want
the other states to introduce the same system of IP protection with
comparable standards and procedures. This article will analyze why
the WICs demand adoption of their system (Part II); how the WICs
intend to expand their traditional IP rights to other nations (Part III);
whether it would be beneficial to other countries to adopt this system
(Part IV); and which incentives the WICs might provide to persuade
other countries to introduce similar IP protection even though it
might not be in their best interests to do so (Part V).
The purpose of this article is not simply to add just another opin-
ion to the debate on international IP protection. Nor does it aim to
rally blind support for the position of the Western industrialized coun-
tries. Rather, this report attempts to present an objective analysis of
all the important arguments of the developed and developing coun-
tries, and to evaluate in like manner all major aspects of traditional IP
protection and potential regulation in GATT.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN
WORLD TRADE
A. Complaints of the Western Industrialized States About
Inadequate Protection of IP
1. Pirating
"Pirating" in its broadest sense is any unauthorized and uncom-
pensated reproduction or use of someone else's creative intellectual
1319
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achievement. 6 In the field of protected processes, products or designs,
pirating may include: unauthorized use of a patented process to manu-
facture one's own products; unauthorized production and sale of a
patented product under one's own brand name; unauthorized use of a
protected successful design to improve production and/or sales of
one's own products; and unauthorized use of technology protected by
trade secrecy. In these areas it is irrelevant whether the pirate has
made the same invention or design and only failed to file it prior to the
licensed owner or is actually using the knowledge of the inventor, ob-
tained via the latter's patent registration or by other means such as
examining of the inventor's products or hiring of her staff.
In the field of protected literary and artistic works, piracy may
involve the unauthorized and uncompensated reproduction and/or
sale of someone else's literary or musical work, performances, broad-
casts, photographs, motion pictures, paintings and drawings, three-di-
mensional objects (sculptures, architectural works, etc.), software, and
works of applied art (wallpapers, etc.) under the name of the original
author; or, alternatively, the unauthorized use of such literary or artis-
tic work or parts of it in recordings, publications or performances
under the name of the pirate. Piracy also occurs in the field of pro-
tected trademarks and service marks. This involves the unauthorized
and uncompensated production and/or sale of goods or services that
imitate someone else's brand-name product or service to the last detail,
including the name and logo of the originator ("counterfeiting"). 7 In
this essay all of these practices shall be addressed as "pirating," unless
it is specifically necessary to distinguish the imitation of an original
product or service. Only in the latter case will the expression "coun-
terfeiting" be used.
When goods or services which are covered by IP rights in WICs
are manufactured and sold or otherwise provided in Newly Industrial-
ized Countries/Lesser Developed Countries (NICs/LDCs) without
the knowledge and consent of the IP owner, the latter loses money in
6. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a
GA7T Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 775 (1989).
7. The U.S International Trade Commission (ITC) has applied a broader definition of coun-
terfeiting, according to which it is sufficient if the imitation is "similar," i.e., the product, name
and logo of the original do not have to be identical. See R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 33-34.
Clearly one should not demand perfect duplication of size, form, color, name, function, etc.;
however, similarity as such should not suffice in all cases. The functions of the trademark (see
infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text) can serve to draw the line between illegal counterfeit-
ing and smart business behavior. If the average customer is likely to be deceived into buying the
imitation product without being aware of it, there is counterfeiting. If the average customer
selects the imitation knowingly, but hoping that its qualities are similar while the price is lower,
there is no counterfeiting.
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several ways. At least part of the sales captured by the imitator would
have gone to the IP owner absent the pirating. Even if the IP owner
herself would not have entered some of the imitator's markets, she
would have received royalties for the sales of the imitator absent the
pirating. Moreover, if counterfeited goods are of inferior quality, the
trademark owner's goodwill is endangered and she will most likely
lose future sales.
In addition to these effects that directly hit the IP owner, there are
a number of indirect effects on the economy of the WICs as a whole.
If pirating is particularly widespread in certain industries (e.g.,
software), research and development ("R & D") and artistic creativity
will be less profitable and therefore decrease; important inventions and
creations may not be made at all or only at a later point in time. This
reduction of R & D and loss of productivity will weaken employment
in the industries affected, which will further burden the social systems
of countries which may already be struggling with high unemploy-
ment." And because less profitable industries will pay less taxes, gov-
ernments will also have fewer resources to deal with their other tasks.
Some of the pirated sales in third countries will displace export sales of
the IP owners, and thus negatively affect the trade balance of the
WICs. In addition, if counterfeited goods of inferior quality are sold
to consumers in the WICs, they may cause damages to life, health or
property.
Pirating, however, may also have beneficial effects: prices of pi-
rated goods are usually lower than those of the protected original be-
cause the IP owner, as a quasi-monopolist, will charge above the
market price as long as she does not have competition. Whether the
lower prices of the pirated product are actually a benefit to consumers
depends on the quality of the goods. Arguably there is no advantage to
consumers if, while paying less, they receive only inferior quality
goods. However, the mere existence of pirated products on the market
will frequently force the IP owner to reduce her own prices to remain
8. A 1984 survey conducted by the ITC estimated that in the five sectors hardest hit in 1982
by counterfeiting and similar practices (apparel, chemicals, transportation equipment, records
and tapes and sporting goods), about 131,000 jobs were lost due to reduced output. See THE
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING ON U.S. INDUSTRy, USITC Pub. 1479, Inv.
No. 332-158 (Jan. 1984) [hereinafter 1984 ITC Survey]. A similar study by the European Parlia-
ment indicated that about 100,000 jobs were lost in Europe in 1986. See THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY COMMITTEE, KEIDANREN & UNION OF INDUSTRIAL AND EMPLOYERS' CONFEDER-
ATIONS OF EUROPE, BASIC FRAMEWORK OF GATT PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
13 (1988) [hereinafter IPC/Keidanren/UNICE]. However, it should be noted that neither of
these studies explains in sufficient detail the method by which the figures were computed, and
both serve, inter alia, the political purpose of rallying support for stricter enforcement of existing
IP protective legislation and/or the creation of stiffer new requirements. The criticism stated
infra concerning the 1987 ITC Survey also applies to the 1984 ITC Survey.
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competitive. As long as she does not simultaneously reduce her qual-
ity standards, the consumers actually get the high-quality products at
a lower price (if they can distinguish them from the low-quality coun-
terfeited imitations). In addition, if prices are lower, overall sales of
the product will usually go up and increase the income of the dealers
involved. 9 These beneficial effects take place in all markets around the
world where the pirated goods are sold. Thus, while the western IP
owners and their national economies have to bear the bulk of the cost
of pirating, their consumers and economies receive only a fraction of
the benefits.
The losses of Western IP owners due to pirating are not limited to
those experienced in the Western countries. Pirated goods are com-
peting with the originals in all world markets. Three types of markets
can be distinguished. First, there is the home state of the pirate. If the
IP owner is trying to sell to that market, the pirate not only has the
advantages of no shipping costs and low wages, she is additionally able
to undersell because she incurs no R & D and marketing costs. A
second market is the home state of the IP owner (e.g. the U.S.). Here
the IP owner would normally have the advantages of low transport
expenses and thorough market knowledge. Theoretically the well-or-
ganized customs procedures and strict laws on IP protection, which
may permit even exclusion or destruction of infringing products,
should effectively keep out pirated goods and enable the IP owners to
reap the benefit of their innovative activities. Yet many U.S. firms
complain that they are being undersold and displaced even in their
own backyard by pirated goods.' 0 Obviously, the sheer volume of
daily shipments of all kinds of goods reaching the U.S. from all parts
of the world makes it hard if not impossible to search accurately for
pirated goods and to prevent their entry. Finally, there are the mar-
kets of all other countries. These countries may or may not provide
adequate protection of IP rights themselves. In any case, they are
equally unable to exclude effectively goods from their markets that
violate IP rights held in their own or other states.
2. Measuring the Impact of Inadequate IP Protection
Over the past few years there have been numerous attempts to esti-
mate the financial losses suffered by western IP owners in the three
9. Sek, "U.S. Intellectual Property Rights and Trade," CONG. RESEARCH SERV. Doc. No.
86-838 E (Aug. 22, 1986), at 3.
10. NATIONAL SECURITY & INT'L AFFAIRS Div., GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, STRENGTHENING
WORLDWIDE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 14 (1987) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
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above-mentioned markets (home market of pirate, home market of IP
owner and other markets) due to "pirated" sales by manufacturers
from NICs/LDCs where IP is "not adequately protected." In particu-
lar the more recent reports show estimated losses of up to $50 billion
annually for U.S. industries alone." All of these studies have been
conducted in the WICs, however, and will have to undergo special
scrutiny concerning the objectivity of their methodologies and results.
Counterfeiting of trademarks and related practices has been esti-
mated to cost U.S. companies $20 billion annually.12 Copyright pirates
from the ten most notorious countries were found to have caused an-
nual damages of up to $1.3 billion.' 3 In the software sector the prob-
lem has grown to an equally dramatic magnitude. The U.S. software
industry supposedly lost "only" $1.3 billion between 1981 and 1984,
but lost close to $1 billion in 1985 alone.'
4
German software dealers have recently discovered that 1.6 times
more personal computers than software packages are sold in Ger-
many; i.e., even professional users frequently do not own a lawful copy
of their operating software, let alone word processing and other appli-
cation software.' 5 Another German survey' 6 found that copyrighted
works and related areas (not including patents, trademarks and other
IP rights) provide roughly 800,000 jobs in the Federal Republic of
Germany, which amounts to 3.1% of the total work force. 17 Copy-
right industries also generate 2.9% of the GNP (approximately US$27
billion in 1987), or 3.1% if computer software is included.' 8 Thus
11. FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECTS ON
THE U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE, USITC Pub. 2065, Inv. No. 332-245 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter
1987 ITC Survey].
12. Statement by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge on "Proposed Intellectual
Property Rights Improvement Act of 1986" (Apr. 7, 1986), at 1.
13. Recommendations of the Task Force on Intellectual Property to the Advisory Commit-
tee for Trade Negotiations (1985), at 2.
14. 3 BUSINESS SOFTWARE PIRACY: REPORT ON FEDERAL DATA SYSTEMS 4 (Apr. 1985).
15. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Mar. 24, 1990, at 16.
16. INSTrrUT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG, MUNICH, WEST GERMANY, DIE VOLKS-
WIRTSCHAFrLICHE BEDEUTUNG DES URHEBERRECHTS 15 (1989) (study for the Ministry of
Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany).
17. Id. at 22.
18. For other important countries, the study lists the following percentages of GNP gener-
ated by copyright industries:
- Australia (1986): 3.1%
- Austria (1986): 2.1%
- Canada (1980): 3.5%
- Finland (1985): 4.0%
- Great Britain (1982): 2.9%
- Netherlands (1982): 2.4%
- Sweden (1978): 6.6%
- United States (1982): 4.6%
The figures are taken from national statistics of these countries, however, and therefore are not
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copyrights are particularly important for West Germany, which tradi-
tionally has many publishing houses and media firms. Between 1980
and 1986, these industries grew faster than the industry average, as to
both employment and share of GNP. In the foreseeable future, this
tendency will become even more remarkable,' 9 and with it the prob-
lem of pirating in this sector.
In March 1987, the United States Trade Representative (USTR),
directed by then President Reagan, asked the U.S. International Trade
Commission ("ITC") to develop quantitative estimates of the distor-
tions in U.S. trade associated with inadequate protection of trade-
marks, copyrights, patents, trade secrets, semiconductor chip designs,
and other types of IP rights in foreign countries. In addition, the ITC
was to identify the products, countries and protection deficiencies that
represented the most serious problems for U.S. firms.20 In February
1988, the ITC presented the first fully comprehensive study of the
problem of inadequate IP protection for U.S. industries and trade.
For its survey, the ITC, inter alia, conducted public hearings and
sent out questionnaires to U.S. firms involved in foreign trade. From
the various data collected, it then computed an estimate for the aggre-
gate losses to U.S. industries. This approach of collecting data by
sending out questionnaires to the industries involved is surely not ideal
because it relies on several debatable assumptions. To obtain reason-
ably accurate results, all firms that lose money due to pirating would
essentially have to be identified and included in the survey. These
firms would then have to cooperate by abiding by requests for the hon-
est disclosure of sensitive data.2' Moreover, the results will be influ-
enced by the question of whether the firms are able to estimate
realistically their individual losses at home and in their various export
markets,22 as well as separate the effect of inadequate IP protection
from various other effects, most of which are equally hard to quan-
tify.23 The Survey did not take into account the above-mentioned
problems, nor did it consider the possibility that firms might deliber-
ately report inflated figures of losses, knowing that the ITC report
would be used by politicians and economists in Washington when de-
bating whether or not IP protection should become a major issue in
directly comparable due to differing criteria of what constitutes a "copyright industry." Id. at
25.
19. Id. at 23.
20. See 1987 ITC Survey, supra note 11, at i.
21. Such as the average royalty rates and profit margins for sales in the U.S. and abroad; see
1987 ITC Survey, supra note 11, app. D.
22. ML at D-14.
23. Id. at H-2.
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international trade negotiations. 24 Furthermore, the range of overall
losses as reported by the ITC reflects the various shortcomings of the
study. While the ITC presented a result of overall losses between $43-
61 billion,25 it had to admit that, depending on the rate of losses to
sales of those firms that had not responded,26 the possible range of
losses could be as broad as between $24-102 billion.27
The report concludes that U.S. firms lost somewhere around $50
billion in 1986. This implicitly suggests to politicians and economists
that U.S. industry would reap additional earnings of about $50 bil-
lions, if only IP protection were improved for the particularly sensitive
products in the most notorious countries.
One could argue that it is rather irrelevant whether U.S. industries
are losing 10 billion or 100 billion U.S. dollars annually: in both cases
it is of paramount importance to negotiate better IP protection abroad.
In addition, the ITC report has already achieved its major goals: not
only has it convinced the various interest groups and governmental
agencies active in this field in the U.S., it even helped to win over the
strongest opponents of the inclusion of IP protection in the GATT
system. The Uruguay Round delegations from India and Brazil (and
other countries) were convinced that GATT should have jurisdiction
over IP matters by the idea that piracy could cost a country in the
magnitude of $43-61 billion per year. 28
Getting IP protection into the Uruguay Round, however, is only
the first step on the way to getting improved IP protection out of the
Uruguay Round. The negotiations are continuing even while this pa-
per is written, and it became obvious long ago that significant results
will only be achieved if a trade-off can be found: i.e., the WICs will
have to make concessions in other areas, such as agriculture or tex-
tiles, to obtain concessions on IP protection from the NICs/LDCs.
Obviously, it is thus important for the delegations of the WICs to
know as precisely as possible the value of concessions obtained in
TRIPS in order to gauge the price of concessions to be made else-
24. There are other incentives for an inflation of these figures, such as the fact that inade-
quate IP protection as an "external factor" may serve as a welcome scapegoat. Blaming losses on
foreign piracy may be a comfortable way of distracting from past neglect by American corporate
management of the need to adapt to international competition and structural changes.
25. See 1987 ITC Survey, supra note 11, Ch. 4.
26. Nobody knows how many legitimate manufacturers, fearing loss of consumer confidence,
might be reluctant to disclose that their products are being counterfeited (GAO REPORT, supra
note 10, at 14) and/or credit, for other competitive reasons (MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny,
supra note 5, at 95-96) or out of concern that their later efforts to do business in certain countries
could be impeded as a result of their complaints and subsequent U.S. action (Id.).
27. See 1987 ITC Survey, supra note 11, at H-2.
28. Daily Report for Executives (BNA) 4 (Apr. 11, 1989).
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where. If the ITC figures significantly overstate the possible gains, this
could mislead the negotiators and the governments who will eventu-
ally have to consent to a trade-off agreement. In such a case, the ITC
survey could backfire in the long run.
If the 1987 ITC Survey reports annual losses of $50 billion, it im-
plies that U.S. industries could gain additional business of the same
magnitude if IP protection were adequate in all countries. Any figures
on possible gains from improved IP protection should be seen in rela-
tion to actual trade statistics. The total volume of worldwide sales of
U.S. industries in 1986 was roughly $5.2 trillion.29 An increase of $50
billion, as suggested by the ITC, would thus amount to about 0.9%, a
figure that seems quite reasonable. However, it is unrealistic not to
distinguish between sales in the U.S. and sales abroad. The domestic
IP protection system of the U.S. is one of the most comprehensive in
the world. Improvements in IP protection would thus have to happen
primarily in the laws and enforcement practices of the major trading
partners and will affect primarily the foreign trade of the U.S. Yet
exports of U.S. industries in 1986 amounted to "only" $220 billion.
30
Clearly, improved IP protection abroad cannot bring a $50 billion
(22%) boost in foreign trade.
Of course, pirated products from abroad do find their way to the
U.S. domestic market and improved IP protection in the home coun-
tries of these products would also reduce this problem. However, this
is an area of pirating in which U.S. consumers and distributors can
benefit because more products would be sold at lower prices. 31 In ad-
dition, a solution to the problem of domestic sales of foreign-pirated
products could be reached by national legislation and enforcement
measures32 and does not necessarily have to be "purchased" in the
framework of GATT.
It should be noted that additional gains of $50 billion would re-
quire a transition to a situation of perfect IP protection where no pi-
rating occurs. This step cannot be achieved in GATT or any other
international framework. The bulk of U.S. trade is taking place with
29. See 1987 ITC Survey, supra note 11, at H-2.
30. Identical figures were published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), in MONTHLY STATISTICS OF FOREIGN TRADE, series A, July 1987 (as re-
produced in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 820 (108th ed. 1988)), and by the
Office of Industry and Trade Information, U.S. Comm. Dept. (as reproduced in WORLD ALMA-
NAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, 183 (1989)).
31. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
32. Perhaps customs procedures could be tightened for those products that have been identi-
fied as particularly affected by pirating, in order to exclude a larger percentage of infringing
products.
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other developed countries that already have a high level of IP protec-
tion (OECD members and other WICs). 3 As a matter of fact, the
drafts for an IP agreement in the Uruguay Round presented so far
34
basically try to take the average level of IP protection of the WICs and
extend it to the other trading countries. Thus, as concerns goods ex-
changed between the WICs and marketing opportunities lost in other
WICs due to pirating by firms from these countries, even an optimal
TRIPS agreement cannot achieve very much. Another problem with
the hypothetical figure of $50 billion is that it presumes that once pi-
rated products are banned from the respective markets, consumers
will spend the same amount of money to purchase the original prod-
ucts. However, this is far from certain in those areas where the con-
sumers have alternative choices (such as the purchase of directly or
indirectly competing products or even saving the money altogether).
An example may illustrate this point. Sales of computer hardware
and software are inseparably related. A buyer usually has to add both
price tags before making a decision. However, both products have
been particularly affected by pirating. Arguably, the phenomenal sales
of PCs to private individuals in recent years depended largely on the
availability of pirated software at little or no cost. On the other hand,
the availability of inexpensive "clones" in U.S. hardware shops has
helped to reach many undecided "honest" buyers who then also
purchased copyrighted software. Absent pirated software and/or
cloned PCs, both the market for "original" PCs and copyrighted
software would be significantly smaller because many consumers
would simply go without a private computer. This argument is used
by Brazil to defend its policy of refusing patents on pharmaceuticals.
If inexpensive pirated medicine is not available, the low-income popu-
lation still will not buy the original. They cannot afford the prices of a
monopolist (who has to charge more to cover her costs of R & D and
market development) and will therefore have to go without such
medicine. 3" Thus, even if the actual volume of pirated sales could be
determined, this figure would not be an accurate indication of the sales
to be gained by legitimate producers absent the pirating.
36
A more scientific approach than that of the ITC to the problem of
quantifying the aggregate losses due to pirating was taken by Gadbaw
33. STATISTICAL ABSTACT OF THE U.S. 820 (108th ed. 1988).
34. See discussion infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
35. For a more detailed analysis, see infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
36. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 14-15
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and Richards. 37 First, they identified the seven most problematic
countries with a combination of low levels of IP protection and large
pirate industries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Republic of Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan). On an industry-by-industry basis, they subse-
quently collected information on the size of the domestic market, the
level of domestic production, exports, pirate sales (domestic and ex-
port), price elasticity of demand for the product in question, projected
price effects due to IP protection, current revenues of IP owners and
the percentage of current revenue accounted for by U.S. companies.
These figures were then used to compute possible increased revenues
obtained through the elimination of piracy and actual present losses of
revenues to U.S. industries.
While Gadbaw and Richards studied only the seven most notori-
ous countries and only the industries most heavily affected by pirat-
ing,38 their figure for 1986 of approximately $3.4 billion in revenues
won by pirates in these countries39 is so significantly lower than the
figures provided in the 1987 ITC Survey that one questions the source
of all the other losses estimated by the ITC.40
The figure of $43-61 billion in annual losses by U.S. industries due
to inadequate IP protection thus seems rather inflated. It is possible
that aggregate losses of all WICs due to sales of pirated and counter-
feited products and services merely reach the lower end of that magni-
tude. The U.S. share would then probably amount to about $10
billion. In any case, it is completely unrealistic to expect billions of
dollars in additional sales for U.S. industries immediately subsequent
to a new GATT agreement on IP or any other multilateral treaty or
any form of unilateral action. Improvement via improved laws and
enforcement procedures in NICs/LDCs will only come gradually.
Nevertheless, the inclusion and emphasis of IP in the Uruguay Round
is justified because industries in the WICs will increasingly rely on
goods with high IP content. 41
3. Insufficient Protection of New Technologies
The problem of piracy will become more severe in the near future
because recent commercial and technological developments - record-
37. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?
379-83 (R. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds. 1988) [hereinafter Gadbaw & Richards].
38. Id. at 379. The industries examined were pharmaceuticals, computers, audio, video,
software, agricultural chemicals, semiconductors and publishing.
39. Id.
40. However, even Gadbaw and Richards have estimated that pirates of pharmaceuticals in
India are gaining 920 million U.S. dollars annually from their activities. l.
41. See id. at4.
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able compact disks, optical character recognition (OCR) scanners, dig-
ital audio tapes (DAT), computer networks and direct broadcasting
satellites - have made or will make piracy easier and more lucrative.
In addition, it is very doubtful whether certain new technologies such
as computer software, semiconductor chips and biotechnology are
protected at all by existing IP laws, despite the fact that some of these
technologies are among the most important technological develop
ments of this century. Benko asks with good reason whether the U.S.
can expect the international community or individual countries to
work out these problems when even the U.S. courts and Congress have
not fully resolved them.
42
a. Computer Software
Software is hard to develop but easy to copy. Original software is
frequently quite expensive, but the consumer receives little in tangible
assets for her money (some disks and a handbook). The combination
of these factors has led to a situation where many otherwise honest
consumers all over the world do not hesitate to buy or swap pirated
software. The rapid diffusion of computers in the WICs has already
led to huge losses for software creators. The prospects for gigantic
future markets for PCs in former Eastern bloc countries and NICs
demonstrate the need to improve protection for software.
However, software does not fit neatly into traditional categories of
IP rights. Some countries43 favor copyright protection for software.
They have argued that software is simply a modern form of writing
brought about by technological development. Thus, copyright protec-
tion should be extended to it, as was the case for sound recordings and
motion pictures.
But software is not addressed to humans; operating systems, in
particular, may never become perceptible for the user. Software is di-
rected at the computer hardware and during its use actually becomes
part of the machine. So called "firmware," semiconductor chips with
their own encoded software, poses additional questions. Furthermore,
copyrights protect only forms of expressions, not the underlying ideas
themselves. If a software code could be slightly changed, such as in the
order of the commands, it might no longer be protected by the
copyright. 44
For these reasons, other countries45 prefer to cover software with
42. See R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 49.
43. E.g., the United States, West Germany and Great Britain.
44. See R. BENKo, supra note 4, at 39-42.
45. E.g., Japan and Brazil.
1329
Michigan Journal of International Law
their industrial property laws. However, patent law does not fit neatly.
either. Since the technology and method of programming are well es-
tablished and do not differ from program to program, it would be vir-
tually impossible to prove the novelty and non-obviousness of a new
word processor or other application software. Opponents of patent
protection for software also argue that this approach would place
software under the regime of the Paris Convention46 on patents and
make it subject to compulsory licensing provisions.
47
These problems seem to support the idea of creating sui generis
laws for the protection of software. However, the disadvantages of
this approach are equally obvious: the draft national laws developed
by a number of countries provide for shorter periods of protection and
otherwise lower standards.48 In addition, software would not be cov-
ered at all in those countries who refuse or delay the passing of na-
tional laws, as long as there is no international regime for protection
like the Berne Convention on copyright law. 49
b. Semiconductor Chips
Semiconductor chips pose problems similar to those of software.
The development of a new chip may cost hundreds of millions of dol-
lars, while constructing a plant to reproduce them can be done for a
fraction of this sum.50 The technology of creating chips via photo-
graphic reproduction of the various layers is well known and does not
differ from chip to chip. Thus the novelty and non-obviousness re-
quired for patent protection cannot be demonstrated. The critical IP
component of chips is the individual design of its layers, the "mask-
work." Copyrights, on the other hand, can only protect the artistic
design of a useful article if it is separable from the utilitarian qualities;
the mask-work, however, has no intrinsic aesthetic purpose of its
own.5
1
For these reasons, the 98th U.S. Congress decided to pass a sui
generis law for the protection of semiconductor mask-works: the
46. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6295, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
47. See R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 39-42.
48. Id. It is rather mysterious, however, why U.S. industries see a problem in protection
periods of "only 15 years" under the draft of Japan, compared to 50 years under U.S. copyright
law. At the current speed of technological development in this area, a program is hopelessly
outdated after less than ten years anyway.
49. The 1971 revised text of the Convention is available from the World Intellectual Property
Organizaton (WIPO); the English version of the text is WIPO Publication No. 287 (E).
50. Id. at 42.
51. Id.
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Semiconductor Chip Protection Act ("SCPA") of 1984.52 The Euro-
pean Community subsequently also issued a directive to its Member
States compelling them to introduce a new form of IP protection for
semiconductor chip designs by the end of 1987.53 Japan and Sweden
have adopted similar laws.54 In all other countries, protection for
mask-works is doubtful or nonexistent until clarified by the respective
legislative organs either via national laws or the adoption and ratifica-
tion of an international agreement.
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations,55 has been impressively agile in
this area. In three negotiating sessions between 1985 and 1987, dele-
gations from over 35 states negotiated the Treaty on Intellectual Prop-
erty in Respect of Integrated Circuits. 56 The treaty's text closely
reflects the legal principles of the SCPA, which is one of the reasons
why 18 NICs have announced their resistance to its adoption and rati-
fication in the present form.5 7 Even if the treaty should be adopted
and ratified by a significant number of states in the near future, its
impact will remain small. This is because it does not contain any pro-
visions for enforcement of the rights it provides (such as whether or
not injunctions, damages, etc. should be available to private parties),
and it has no consultation or dispute settlement mechanisms.58
c. Biotechnology
Traditional biotechnological innovations are usually protected in
the U.S. by patents or plant breeder laws. On the international level,
WIPO administers the International Convention for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants. 59 The European Patent Convention 6° and
various national laws of European (and other) countries generally do
not allow the patenting of plants and animals if they are merely a com-
bination of several naturally existing varieties. They only permit pat-
enting (including process patenting) of microbiologically modified
52. Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 904 (1988)).
53. Directive 87/54 of 16 December 1986, 30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 24) 36 (1987).
54. See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 1, 50 n.22.
55. For information about the World Intellectual Property Organization, see infra notes 73-
96 and accompanying text.
56. Reproduced at 28 I.L.M. 1477 (1989).
57. Gadbaw & Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the New GATT Round, in Gadbaw &
Richards, supra note 37, at 50-52. In particular those countries that have large pirating indus-
tries in this sector (Brazil, India, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) seem to be
opposed to its adoption.
58. Id.
59. Dec 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89, as revised Oct. 23, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 10199.
60. 13 I.L.M. 268 (1974)
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plants and animals and of breedings not derived from naturally ex-
isting varieties. 61 The latter distinction is frequently unclear and cre-
ates significant problems for Americans. Patent application requires
disclosure of culture samples. If patent eligibility is refused in Europe,
this disclosure makes subsequent efforts to protect the innovation via
trade secrets fruitless. U.S. firms are therefore reluctant to file patent
applications even in the U.S. because their culture samples and de-
scriptions might be copied by foreign firms for production and sale in
unprotected markets.62 The situation in Third World countries is even
worse, and the only reason why biotechnology has not yet reached a
critical level of pirating activity is the (decreasing) lack of know-how
in many NICs.
d. Recordable Compact Disks
Recordable compact disks (CDs) and related support technologies.
are not unprotected and endangered themselves, but they are media
for transport and storage of data, which may make pirating of copy-
righted works easier and more lucrative. CDs are recorded with a
laser beam at the factory after production of the plastic disks. The
encoded information is then read by another laser beam in the CD
player. In contrast to traditional records, the information is stored in
digital rather than in analog form, which allows storage of much more
data per disk. Furthermore, the reading via laser beam is completely
friction-free so that CDs not only last much longer than records or
tapes, but also allow perfect reproduction of their data without any
background noise.
Initially CDs were available only in prerecorded form, usually con-
taining music. During the last few years CD players (or "drives")
have been constructed that allow use of CDs as computer storage me-
dia, containing, for example, dictionaries or encyclopedias. The latest
improvements to this technology are disk drives that allow for home
recordings and even re-recordings onto CDs by the users of music,
video films or computer data (even programs like word processors,
e.g.). In principle, such disks can then be used on any existing CD
player, or alternatively in CD-drives for computers which can search
huge amounts of data for key-words or otherwise process the recorded
information. Shortly after their introduction, such machines were
available at prices around $25,000. This is still out of reach for private
users, but experience with PCs, VCRs and the like teaches that prices
61. H, HUDMANN, GEWERBLICHER REcHTSSCHUTZ 81 (5th ed. 1988).
62. See R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 44.
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will drop quickly. In any case, even at $25,000, the machines are at-
tractive to professional users who want to sell the recorded disks.
A blank CD (current price between $5-10, which will also decrease
with growth in production) can be used not only to make a perfect
copy of an original CD containing an hour of music, but an entire
encyclopedia of 20 volumes can be recorded onto one or two of them.
Thus third parties can make perfect copies of encyclopedias, which are
now on sale on CDs for about $1000, at a cost of under $20. Espe-
cially if seen in conjunction with OCR scanners, 63 the potential for
pirating becomes apparent.
e. Optical Character Recognition Scanners
OCR scanners serve to read printed information into computer
memory. At least with low-end OCR scanners, the user first has to
"train" the machine to understand a certain typeset. The actual scan-
ning process is similar to photocopying. State-of-the-art scanners will
read several pages per minute with error rates under one percent.
Once in the computer memory, the data can be manipulated and cop-
ied like any text entered via keyboard and word processor. Texts
which currently exist only in printed form can be scanned and made
available for distribution via recordable CDs, ordinary magnetic disks
or other databases. Thus, if a publisher is reluctant to place her ency-
clopedia or dictionaries on CDs for fear of pirating, someone else
might do both jobs for her.
f. Digital Audio Tapes
DAT is a new technology for the storage of data on cassettes. It is
most attractive for music. The data is transformed into a digital for-
mat, which eliminates all background noise. DAT allows the produc-
tion of perfect copies on ordinary music cassettes. As long as CD
players are not commonplace in a country and the price for CD re-
corders is in the magnitude of $25,000, this is the best alternative for
anybody interested in making high quality copies of music. Not only
can perfect copies of a CD be made on tape, but perfect copies from
that tape also can subsequently be drawn, and so on.
Political lobbying efforts of American music producers and broad-
casters have so far prevented the large scale market introduction of
DAT machines in the U.S. Japanese hardware producers have agreed
to negotiations regarding the concerns of American IP owners. Con-
gress has refused to adopt a law that would have added a basic royalty
63. See discussion immediately following.
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to all blank tapes sold in the U.S. because it did not want to define
home copying on a non-commercial level as pirating,64 since not all
blank tapes are actually used for recordings of copyrighted music.
The hardware manufacturers, on the other hand, have refused to in-
stall devices in their machines that would electronically prevent the
recording of copyrighted music. Negotiations led to a compromise at
the end of 1989, according to which the one-time recording of copy-
righted music, even from CDs, will be technically possible and lawful.
However, the further copying of that recording will be prohibited and
technically impossible. 65 Whether this agreement will be honored by
its parties remains to be seen.
g. International Computer Networks
The introduction of integrated services digital network ("ISDN")
technology allows the transmission of digital signals (primarily com-
puter data) via ordinary telephone lines. International service indus-
tries like banking, securities and insurance rely heavily on these
services. Many multinational firms have installed computer networks
that exchange data this way. Pirates may gain access to ISDN systems
just like "hackers" have in the past. Once an illegal user has gained
access, computer software, databases (e.g. LEXIS), computerized in-
formation services and even confidential private and military data can
easily be transmitted across national boundaries without significant
risk of criminal sanction.
h. Direct Broadcasting Satellite Technology
Direct broadcasting satellite technology involves the transmission
of satellite signals directly to and from individual users. The signals
can be radio and television programs, telephone calls or other data
flows. A multinational firm might use this form of communication to
exchange data between its various subsidiaries without having to go
through (costly) ordinary telephone lines. The data could be ciphered
and thus removed from any control by government authorities. The
possibilities for abuse are obvious. At the moment, however, the cost
of this technology is still prohibitive.
These are just some of the more important new technologies that
will revolutionize the storage and transportation of data and other
64. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
public does have the right to make video recordings of copyrighted films for personal use, free of
charge. 464 U.S. 417, 601 (1984). The rationale of this decision should equally apply to private
recordings of copyrighted music.
65. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 30, 1990 (Technik & Motor), at 1.
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copyrighted works. On the one hand, they will help lawful owners
and users of the data to save costs and improve their services. On the
other hand, it should be obvious even from this brief introduction that
unlawful users (pirates) can unjustly benefit from these innovations
and will be able to cause even more damage to the owners of the IP.
4. Threats to the Existing Worldwide System of IP Protection
Large-scale pirating of patented products causes two effects to the
global system of IP protection. First, inventors will be reluctant to
patent their innovations. The requirement to disclose the invention is
designed to inform the public that certain innovations have been
achieved and are already protected. This reduces duplication of efforts
and expenses. In addition, the information can be used as a basis for
further innovation of the same or related product or process. How-
ever, disclosure also makes pirating easy if not prevented by adequate
IP laws. Inventors will therefore prefer protection by trade secrecy.
This in turn cuts off other researchers from valuable information.
Second, in all those areas where trade secrets cannot adequately
protect the inventions (e.g., copyrighted works which can only be mar-
keted by disclosure), industry will have increasing difficulty recovering
the costs of innovation, product development and marketing. How-
ever, recovering these costs, along with a certain margin of profit to
compensate for the risks involved, is imperative for the development of
the next generation of products, processes and services.
Legal protection of trademarks represents an attempt to curb simi-
lar phenomena. Trademarks have two main functions. For the manu-
facturer, they offer the advantage of distinguishing her products from
those of competitors. This guarantees a return on investments in
higher quality and advertising. On the other hand, consumers have
the advantage of recognizing the products of specific manufacturers.
Thus they can rely on a known standard of quality and safety and, if
the product is defective, can obtain a replacement and/or seek
damages.
When counterfeiting becomes rampant, even if limited to certain
industries, both of the trademark system's functions are impaired.
Consumers lose their confidence in specific trademarks or the trade-
mark system as a whole as an indicator of quality and the efforts of the
trademark owner to develop the market and establish consumer good-
will are no longer rewarded by sufficient sales. 66 The trademark
holder thus is forced to cut the costs of production to regain competi-
66. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
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tiveness with the pirate. Similar reasons will force the trademark
owner to reduce advertising and other marketing efforts which in-
crease her overhead and only allow more free-riding by the pirate. Re-
ductions in advertising will hurt consumers as it is one of the main
sources of product-related information. As a consequence, of course,
the advertising industry also suffers.
In addition to benefitting illegally from the advertising and market
development efforts of the trademark owner, the IP pirate can also
trade on the reputation of the quality of the owner's goods. Once the
trademark owner detects counterfeiting and its source and starts legal
proceedings to exclude the products from entering the country or the
chain of distribution, the pirate has to look for a new field of activity.
Large-scale counterfeiting of a particular product is therefore usually
limited in time. Consequently, the pirate does not have the same in-
centives as the trademark owner to maintain high standards of quality,
but is more interested in realizing a quick gain. In addition to being
unconcerned about harming the trademark owner, many pirates do
not have the same know-how and experience as the owner and are
thus simply unable to meet the quality standards of the originals. This
may result in substandard products which are unsafe for consumers.
Beyond the fact that consumers lose money if they buy poor qual-
ity for normal prices, their health and even lives are endangered if
electric appliances, spare parts for cars, machines, airplanes, food and
drugs are not safe. Substandard counterfeited goods can even be dan-
gerous to an entire industry, as the example of the loss of 15% of the
Kenyan coffee crop due to the use of an ineffective imitation of a fungi-
cide showed.
67
Intellectual property can be seen as a factor of production like la-
bor, capital or raw materials. The distribution of production factors
among the countries provides comparative advantages or disadvan-
tages concerning the production of certain goods or services. Under
the existing world economic order, WICs tend to have advantages
such as skilled labor, well developed infrastructures, capital and IP.
NICs/LDCs tend to have advantages such as inexpensive unskilled
labor, raw materials and land. World trade that is beneficial to all
sides requires fair use of one's own advantages and respect for those of
others.
If the governments in NICs/LDCs tolerate pirating, their manu-
facturers do not have to pay royalties for use of the IP production
factor, and thus gain an artifical competitive advantage in world trade.
67. Id. at 15.
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Their design and R & D costs are minimal: since they only copy suc-
cessful products, they do not incur the cost of developing products
that turn out to be market failures. Finally, these companies free-ride
on the advertising and market development efforts of the lawful manu-
facturers.68 Non-protection of IP thus distorts trade much like other
unfair governmental interventions, such as subsidies.
B. Previous attempts to solve the problem
Trademark protection dates back to ancient Greece and Rome.
Patents appeared in the fourteenth century in the form of state-guar-
anteed monopolies called "privileges"; they were not granted as a re-
ward for innovation or creativity, however, but rather as a political
favor or simply to generate money for the authorities. A modern pat-
ent in the form of a ten-year monopoly was first granted in Venice in
1474 to inventors who registered novel and workable ideas. 69
Although international trade was flourishing in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, governments for a long time granted IP rights
only to their own citizens. In addition, all IP rights were limited in
effect to the territory of the country granting them. Therefore, if the
owner of a patent, trademark or copyrighted work wanted protection
in several countries, she had to obtain it separately in each country
under the respective (and sometimes discriminatory) national laws.
In 1873, the first international patent congress convened in Vienna.
The delegates had planned to create a uniform IP law for all states.
However, great differences in the various national laws and the reluc-
tance of the nation states to reform their laws forced the conference to
settle for considerably less: national treatment for all foreigners from
other member states of the new international union for the protection
of industrial property.70 Thus, national treatment became the preemi-
nent principle reflected in the international Paris Convention for the
protection of patents signed in 1883, 71 as well as the Berne Convention
for the protection of copyrights established in 1886.72 Both were re-
vised and amended several times. However, not all signatories have
ratified all revisions, which can make it difficult to determine the exact
obligations between two member states.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was cre-
68. Id. at 10.
69. See H. HurmA1N, supra note 61, at 10-14.
70. Id at 31.
71. See supr note 46.
72. See supra note 49.
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ated by the WIPO Convention"3 on July 14, 1967. It came into force
in 1970 and became a specialized agency of the United Nations in
1974. WIPO "encourages the conclusion of new international treaties
and the modernization of national legislations; it gives technical assist-
ance to developing countries; it assembles and disseminates informa-
tion; . . . and promotes other administrative cooperation among
member States."174 In addition, WIPO centralizes the administration
of all but a few of the multilateral international covenants on the pro-
tection of IP."
A substantial number of bilateral or regional treaties in the area of
73. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, opened for signa-
ture July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. See WORLD INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GENERAL INFORMATION, WIPO Publication No. 401(E), at
14 n.1 (1988) [hereinafter WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION].
74. See WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 73, at 6.
75. At the present time WIPO administers the following unions and treaties (The respective
years of adoption and membership as of June 30, 1988, are noted in parenthesis. A "*" indicates
U.S. membership.):
- Berne Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work (1886, 770). The United
States joined after June 30, 1988, and became the 78th member. The Berne Implementa-
tion Act had passed the House and was ratified by the Senate on October20, 1988. This
act explictly provides that the convention will not be self-executing so as to avoid colli-
sions with moral rights. This had been the reason why the U.S. had always hesitated to
join the Union. See Joos & Moufang, Report on the Second Ringberg Symposium, in
GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC'ION OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 12 n.1 (F. Beier & 0. Schricker eds. 1989) [hereinafter Joos &
Moufang].
- Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Sig-
nals Transmitted by Satellite (1974, 11");
- Budapest Union for the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorga-
nisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (1977, 22*);
- Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Un-
authorized Duplication of Their Phonograms (1971, 410);
- Hague Union for the International Deposit of Industrial Designs (1925, 21);
- International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)
(1961, 17");
- Lisbon Union for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their Interna-
tional Registration (1958, 16);
- Locarno Union for the Establishment of an International Classification for In-
dustrial Designs (1968, 15);
- Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of
Source on Goods (1891, 32);
- Madrid Union for the International Registration of Marks (1891, 27);
- Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol (1981, 32);
- Nice Union for the International Classification of Goods and Services for the
Purposes of the Registration of Marks (1957, 33*);
- Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883, 980);
- Patent Cooperation Treaty for Cooperation in the Filing, Searching, and Exami-
nation of International Applications for the Protection of Inventions Where
Such Protection is Sought in Several Countries (1970, 40*);
- Strasbourg Union for the Establishment of Worldwide Uniformity of Patent
Classification (1971, 27*);
- Trademark Registration Treaty for the Filing of International Applications for
the Registration of Trademarks Where Protection is Sought in Several Coun-
tries (1973, 5);
Summer 19901 Intellectual Property In The Uruguay Round 1339
IP protection exist outside the framework of WIPO.76 Furthermore,
two important worldwide multilateral treaties are not administered by
WIPO: the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Pro-
ducers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Neighboring
Rights)77 and the Universal Copyright Convention.
7
A GATT Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation
of Counterfeit Goods 7 9 ["Anti-Counterfeiting Code"] was suggested
by the U.S. at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1978. By late 1982, the
U.S., the EC, Japan and Canada had reached agreement on a draft
proposal. Opposition from the developing countries, however, pre-
vented adoption of such a code. At the time of the Punta del Este
Declaration 0 in 1986, several Western delegations still wanted to con-
sider this suggestion and bring the negotiations to a successful end
within the Uruguay Round, leaving more comprehensive suggestions
covering other aspects of IP rights to later negotiating rounds. This
strategy has now been abandoned for fear that a successful Anti-Coun-
terfeiting Code might take the momentum out of the negotiations for a
broader, all-inclusive code.
C. Complaints about WIPO
Of the WIPO treaties, only the Paris and Berne Unions have a
widespread membership, and even there it is far from "universal." In
particular, a few of the most problematic countries are not members
- Vienna Union for the Establishment of an International Classification of the
Figurative Elements of Marks (1973, 5).
Several new treaties have been adopted but are not yet in effect:
- Geneva Treaty on the International Recording of Scientific Discoveries (1978);
- Madrid Multilateral Convention on Double Taxation of Copyright Royalties
(1979);
- Vienna Agreement on the Protection of Type Faces and their International De-
posit (1973).
WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 73, at 14 n.l; a brief introduction to the
more important of these treaties is included in R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 51-56.
76. Significant regional examples include:
- African Regional Industrial Property Organisation (1976, 14);
- Buenos Aires Convention on Literary and Artistic Copyright (1910, 20 members*, 9
ratifications*);
- Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Agreement (1976, 10);
- European Patent Convention (1973, 13);
- Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific, and Ar-
tistic Work (1946, 21 members*, 15 ratifications);
- Mexico City Convention on Literary and Artistic Copyright (1910, 16 members*, 7
ratifications*).
WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 73, at 14 n.l; R. BENKo, supra note 4, at 51-56.
77. (1961, 32*); administered jointly by WIPO, UNESCO and ILO.
78. (1952, 750); administered by UNESCO.
79. See R. BENKo, supra note 4, at 10.
80. GATT Press Release No. 1396, (Sept. 25, 1986).
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and therefore not subject to the rules: India, Singapore and Taiwan are
not signatories to the Paris Union and the Republic of Korea, Singa-
pore and Taiwan are not signatories to the Berne Union.81 Thus, they
are not even obligated to follow the low minimum standards of these
treaties.
The main thrust of all WIPO treaties is the principle of national
treatment and the right of priority. National treatment requires each
contracting state to treat nationals from other states as it does its own
nationals concerning all national laws and procedures in the field of IP
protection. Foreigners from other contracting states can thus file pat-
ent applications, for example, on the same terms as nationals, and will
receive the same periods and conditions of protection if they fulfill the
requirements.
The right of priority means that a patent, trademark or industrial
design application fied in one contracting state will establish the appli-
cant's priority to apply for protection in any of the other contracting
states within a specified period of time (twelve months for patents, six
months for trademarks). These other applications will be regarded as
having been filed at the same time as the original. This prevents inter-
lopers from copying patents and trademarks applied for or issued in
one state and claiming them as their own in another, before the legiti-
mate owner has time to file in his own right.82
The conventions usually establish minimum standards of protec-
tion that must be recognized by all signatories in their national laws.
Minimum periods of protection are frequent (e.g., fifty years for copy-
rights according to the Berne Convention) and so are certain common
rules such as limits to compulsory licensing and forfeiture of IP rights.
Finally, a number of treaties aim at a certain harmonization of the
formalities involved in the application for protection under an IP
right,83 making parallel applications in different countries easier for an
innovator.
Apart from these minimum standards, however, the contracting
states have broad discretion to legislate as they wish in matters of pro-
tection of IP. Certain fields of technology can be excluded from pat-
entability (e.g. pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, agricultural
chemicals) or copyrightability (e.g. educational materials). The signa-
tories may stipulate whether a patent or other IP right should be
granted with or without examination of novelty and non-obviousness.
81. &e WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 73, at 15, 44.
82. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 25 n.2.
83. See, eg., Paris Convention, art. IV; Berne Convention, art. 5; Universal Copyright Con-
vention, Sept. 6, 1952, art, II, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, 136-38.
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They can fix the duration of patent terms (such as only seven years for
chemicals if used in the production or preservation of food). And pat-
entability can be limited to the process of production and refused as to
the end product. Lastly, the details of procedure and administration
are also fixed by each state individually."
With this margin of discretion, the treaties are inviting abuse of IP
rights. For example, the principle of national treatment is useless for
foreigners if a state does not provide adequate treatment for its own
nationals. NICs/LDCs may choose to exclude all those technological
areas where their pirating industry is larger than their innovative in-
dustry, in particular high-tech areas like semiconductor chips,
software, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Some states may provide
for very short patent terms in all those areas where importers are dom-
inant, and long periods for all those where domestic industries have an
edge.8
5
In the field of chemicals, some states limit patents to the process of
manufacture and refuse product patents. This allows their domestic
producers to vary the process slightly, thus creating a new and unpro-
tected process. Exclusion orders against products made from such
new processes are unlikely because the patentee will find it difficult to
satisfy her burden of proving the infringement. In addition, even if an
exclusion order is issued for products made in a certain process, an
infringement of the process patent is "invisible" to the customs offi-
cials because the product is identical. All this is done without viola-
tion of the letter or even the spirit of the overbroad provisions in the
conventions.
Minimum standards for protection are of limited effect if a state
indirectly discriminates against foreigners. Compulsory licensing or
even forfeiture of a patent is permitted, for example, when a patent is
not worked domestically within a certain period of time by the owner.
Without violating its international obligations a state could require do-
mestic working within relatively short periods of time. In addition,
Western IP owners may be confronted with laws and regulations on
investment and transfer of IP rights that make it nearly impossible to
work the patent before expiration of the deadline. Once a state applies
its compulsory licensing laws, it may not only require licensing to do-
mestic firms at below-market compensation, it can even require exclu-
sive licenses. This amounts to expropriation (in that country) because
84. See WIPO GENERAL IN1ORMATION, supra note 73, at 20.
85. See P. BENKo, supra note 4, at 30 (citing the example of Costa Rica which is said to offer
a patent term of only one year on food, agrochemicals and drugs).
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the owner can neither work the patent herself nor transfer it to some-
body else.
There are other problems inherent in existing IP treaties. Proce-
dural requirements can be used to discriminate against foreigners. For
example, a government might establish very complicated procedures,
which could include very short "grace periods" between first publica-
tion and filing of the patent.8 6 Frequently, there are problems with the
enforcement of IP laws. Even if a state has adequate laws on the
books, its enforcement practices may be so lax that the laws become
ineffective, even though this may not be in violation of its international
obligations.8 7 In addition, certain new technologies88 are either not
protected at all or not sufficiently embraced by the existing system of
conventions. The agreements have simply failed to keep pace with
technological advances. 89
The various WIPO conventions authorize-but do not require the
exclusion or seizure of counterfeit products at national borders. For
example, article 9 of the Paris Union provides that counterfeit goods
must either be seized at the border, prevented from entry or seized
inside the country. However, the provision continues by stating that
in case these remedies are not available under the domestic laws of the
country in question, they must be replaced by such remedies as are
available. 90
In general, IP protection is atomized into too many treaties with
varying membership and is preoccupied with technical details without
regard to the larger picture.91 A study has shown, for example, that
less than half of all signatories of the Berne Union actually have ade-
quate copyright protection, although existing laws usually are fully in
accordance with the convention. 92 Thus the content (rules and stan-
dards) of the WIPO conventions is really not sufficiently clear and
strict to provide adequate protection of IP in all contracting parties.
Article 28 of the Paris Convention, added in 1967, provides a pro-
cedure for dispute settlement on the international level. According to
this rule, one member state can sue another for violating its obligations
under the convention. Jurisdiction is vested in the International Court
86. See R. BENo, supra note 4, at 31 (listing examples).
87. See Reichman, supra note 6, at 4.
88. For example, biotechnology, semiconductor chips and software.
89. Benko, Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay Round, 11 WORLD ECON. 217, 221
(1988).
90. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 35-36.
91. See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 29.
92. See Joos & Moufang, supra note 75, at 903.
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of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. Fundamental difficulties within this
procedure exist, however. First of all, while its judges have an excel-
lent reputation as independent, nonpartisan international lawyers, the
ICJ has no expertise in matters of IP. Secondly, the majority of the
member states of the convention never accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICJ in IP matters, and thus cannot be sued before it
against their will. Last but not least, even those states that do accept
its jurisdiction have never sued one another before the ICJ. There has
not been a single proceeding since 196793 because patent disputes were
considered to be too trivial to bring before the ICJ. Moreover, such a
suit would be considered an unfriendly act against the defendant state.
As long as these problems are not addressed by WIPO, the dispute
settlement system is effectively worthless.
The WICs have complained about U.N.-style voting blocs in
WIPO, i.e., the developing countries (Group of 77), the WICs (Group
B) and the socialist countries which used to be organized in the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), have almost always
voted as a group, even if the result does not adequately reflect the
interests of some members. This system is particularly annoying for
the WICs because the NICs/LDCs, due to their sheer number, can
vote for or against anything and will always be the majority; or, alter-
natively, the three blocs can "block" each other and stalemate any
progress.
At the Conference to Revise the Paris Convention (1980-1984), the
WICs hoped to strengthen existing minimum standards of protection
for patents and trademarks and to commit the NICs/LDCs to im-
prove their legislative and administrative practices. The latter coun-
tries, however, entered into the negotiations with the goal of
legitimizing their prior derogations" from the rules of the Paris Con-
vention and lowering certain standards, or even obtaining a general
regime of preferential treatment. 95 As these positions are diametri-
cally opposed, a consensus was impossible and the entire conference
failed after five years of preparatory meetings and four diplomatic con-
ference sessions.
Over more than a decade, the WICs have unsuccessfully attempted
to strengthen IP protection within WIPO. In effect, they have not
93. Id at 896 (citing Kunz-Hallstein).
94. A particularly disputed aspect was the authority to grant exclusive compulsory licenses,
which would in effect remove the patent from the owner's control as far as that country is con-
cemed, i.e. a state could grant the right to a domestic firm at below market. compensation and
prohibit the original owner from using the right domestically or importing competing goods. See
GAO REPoRT, supra note 10, at 26.
95. See Reichman, supra note 6, at 18.
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even managed to maintain the previous levels of minimum standards,
as numerous derogations by the NICs/LDCs in their laws and admin-
istrative practices show. In fact, suggestions for softening existing IP
conventions even further are now pending in various WIPO fora.
Given the additional problems posed by important new technologies,
it cannot be surprising, then, that the WICs are looking for different
avenues for protecting their interests.96
III. THE PROPOSED GATT CODE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Advantages of GATT
Over the last decade or two, technology and IP have increasingly
become issues affecting international trade. On the one hand, industry
representatives perceive the lack of IP protection as a barrier to trade.
They are reluctant to exchange goods or services with certain coun-
tries for fear of pirating or, in extreme cases, they do not want to ex-
port sensitive technologies at all because the danger of disclosure to
third-country pirates is greater even in developed countries with other-
wise adequate IP protection. On the other hand, new legislation re-
flects the growing interdependency of trade and IP protection: section
301, "Super 301," "Special 301" and section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended by the Omnibus Trade And Competitiveness Act of
1988,97 all permit or even require retaliation with trade measures for
inadequate protection of IP by foreign countries.98
GATT is the only multilateral instrument that lays down agreed
rules for the conduct of international trade. Consequently, the busi-
ness community will want to turn to GATT in an attempt to overcome
the new barriers to trade, and legislators will have to look to GATT
because their laws may be found to violate its provisions. GATT is
not only the principal set of rules for international trade, it is also the
primary global body concerned with further negotiations of additional
or improved rules for international trade and further reductions of
trade barriers. This double function--of code of rules and forum for
negotiatios99--seems to be the ideal answer for the problems encoun-
tered by exporters and importers regarding the lack of IP protection in
some countries, and the unilateral trade-restrictive measures of others.
Furthermore, GATT has a reputation of being "an institution capable
96. See R. BmEo, supra note 4, at 9.
97. Pub.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1164 (codified as 19 U.S.C. 2411 (Supp. 1 1989)).
98. For a brief analysis of the legality of these national laws under general GATT and WIPO
obligations of the United States, see supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
99. S. GOLT, THE GATr NEGOTnATIoNS 1986-90: OIoGINs, IsuES AND PRosp'crs 2
(1988).
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of bringing together conflicting interests, obtaining agreements, and
then administering those agreements." 100
GATT has a number of advantages which WIPO lacks. GAIT
offers a new start for IP protection. For several reasons, it may be
easier to write a completely new treaty covering all aspects of IP pro-
tection than to renegotiate and amend several existing treaties which
all cover only certain aspects. For example, the existing treaties leave
too much room for interpretation which will be used by parties with
contradicting interests in differing ways. It will be difficult to find a
consensus on what the law is, before negotiations on what the law
should become can even begin. The existing treaties are also limited to
specific aspects of IP. Certain new aspects and technologies may fall
into the gaps in these treaties. It will be hard to decide which type of
IP protection should apply, for example, for software, and that tradi-
tional type most likely will not even fit well.
Membership in the existing treaties may be so widespread and the
parties' interests may be so contradicting that a consensus on specific
improvements cannot be found. In a GATT code, by contrast, those
countries finding it impossible to agree could abstain from member-
ship. Initially, the code could be limited to those countries with paral-
lel interests and those ready to accept a package deal. Others can join
later when they find it beneficial to do so. Experience with previous
side-codes has shown that no individual country likes to be exposed as
the one preventing conclusion of a new code. Thus it seems likely that
even tough opponents, such as India, will be ready to adopt the code
by consensus and will then simply refuse to become contracting
parties. 101
GATT offers broad coverage of many aspects related to trade,
while WIPO deals exclusively with IP matters. Thus GATT offers the
possibility of creating a package deal of give-and-take that is satisfac-
tory for many sides.102 NICs and LDCs that make concessions by
improving their protection of IP can be offered concessions in areas of
interest to them, such as agriculture and textiles. The disadvantages
perceived by many NICs/LDCs as a result of strengthened IP protec-
tion-the fear of higher royalty transfers to IP owners in WICs and
less access to modem technology due to a lack of resources to acquire
what has previously been pirated-can thus be compensated.10 3
Voting in GATT is perceived as less problematic than voting in
100. See Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 57, at 93.
101. See Benko, supra note 89, at 222.
102. See Joos & Moufan& supra note 75, at 898, 902.
103. See infra notes 236-56, and accompanying text.
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WIPO organs. The contracting parties of GATI" have not formed
UN-style voting blocs;104 i.e., there is not the problem that G-77,
Group B and CMEA countries always vote together for political rea-
sons even if it is against their own interests in the given case. This
voting behavior is not very likely to begin in the foreseeable future
either, because the economic interests within the three blocs vary con-
siderably, and the importance of economic prosperity and competitive-
ness in world trade results in a healthy political pragmatism. The
ongoing reforms in the Eastern European countries also support the
conclusion that rational economic interests will continue to dominate
over ideological rhetoric in GATT, even if several of these countries
should ultimately become members.
GATT dispute settlement procedures are not seen as ideal by the
WICs. In fact their improvement is one of the other issues on the
agenda of the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, GAIT allows the reso-
lution of disputes brought by one country against another by rulings of
independent "expert panels," and although the panel rulings are not
binding like court decisions, in the 40-year history of complaints,
nearly all disputes addressed through this process have been eventu-
ally settled. Developing countries have participated as complainants,
respondents and panel members from the very beginning.105
However, several concerns have been expressed against the GATT
system of dispute settlement. Ballreich has argued that the con-
tracting parties of GAT are judges in their own cause because their
representatives sit on the panels and the panel reports can only be
adopted by consensus, so that the defendant can effectively block
adoption of a ruling.° 6 The system is also said to be ill-suited for the
enforcement of IP protection because GATT article XXIII(2) allows
only "appropriate" sanctions. This may require difficult financial de-
terminations to find out the precise amount of economic damage done
by the pirating.1°7
These arguments have little merit. Not only will the currently-
discussed improvements of the GATT dispute settlement take care of
Ballreich's and similar concerns; more importantly, a new IP code
would not become a verbatim copy of existing GATT articles. The
existing drafts include their own provisions on dispute settlement.
104. See GAO RE RT, supra note 10, at 26.
105. See Oadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 57, at 43 n.8.
106. Badreich, Enthdlt dar GA7T den Weg aus dem Dilemma der steckengebliebenen PVU-
Revison?, 1987 GEwERELicHER RECHTSSCHuirz UND URHEBERREcHT: ZErscHRivr DER
DETrrscnniN VEREINGUNO FOR oEWERLICHEN RE HTcHUTZ UND URHEBERRECIT, IN-
TERNATIONALER Tin 747, 755.
107. See Joos & Moufang, supra note 75, at 902.
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While they are modeled after the GATT, they are also adapted to the
special problems of IP protection.
Another question which has been raised is why a GATT code
should allow sanctions against a government, given the fact that the
infringements of IP laws are committed by private individuals neither
employed nor encouraged by their home state.108 This objection over-
looks the fact that the home state of the pirate is not "punished" for
the pirating, but for its failure to provide adequate protection for for-
eign IP in its laws and administrative procedures.
If the Uruguay Round succeeds in adopting a new code on the
protection of IP, the situation of IP owners in all countries will im-
prove.1°9 First, they would be required to seek civil remedies under
the domestic laws of the exporting and/or importing state, as in the
past. However, these domestic laws will become more effective in all
those states whose laws were not adequate up to now and would no
longer be in conformity with international obligations under the new
code. Additionally, IP owners could seek remedies such as exclusion
or seizure and destruction under domestic trade laws of the exporting
and/or importing state. Contracting parties to the new code would
again be required to bring their administrative, judicial and customs
procedures up to the newly-required level of enforceability.
If the above steps do not suffice or are not effectuated by a signa-
tory, other contracting states could use the GATT dispute settlement
procedures to obtain a panel ruling, and, if necessary, enforce it via
GATT-authorized trade sanctions.
B. Possibilities for the Uruguay Round Negotiations
Whether a new GATT code on IP will effectively reduce pirating
and the losses to Western IP owners depends on two factors of equal
importance: membership and content. A code with perfect standards,
procedural requirements and effective dispute settlement provisions
will be of little use if it is signed only by member states of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which
already have a high level of IP protection. Such a code would miss the
aim of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 1o On the other hand, a code
108. Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GA TT: A iew from
the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989).
109. Baldwin & Richardson, Issues in the Uruguay Round, NATIONAL BUREAU op Eco-
NOMIC RESEARCH CONFERENCE REPORT 69 (1987).
110. The 1987 ITC Survey, supra note 11, is again misleading in this respect: its Appendix G
contains statistical data on the number of firms that have complained about inadequate IP pro-
tection, listed for the various countries. As one would expect, the figures are the highest for
countries like Brazil, Taiwan and the other "major target countries." However, contrary to what
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with low standards, a kind of least common denominator, may be ac-
ceptable to many countries but would only duplicate existing ineffec-
tive WIPO conventions.
1. The "Maximum Standards for the Few"Approach
If the new GATT code on IP sets very high standards that approx-
imately correspond with the national laws of the EC, the U.S. and
Japan, it will be very hard to get the major pirating countries to sign it.
The ability of the Western governments to attract NICs/LDCs with
concessions in other areas is naturally limited by such factors as the
U.S. balance of trade deficit and protectionist domestic pressures.
Thus the emphasis would probably come to lie on coercive measures,
in particular the threat and application of trade sanctions, as provided
for in sections 301 and 337.111 This might persuade a few countries,
but would not be sufficient with respect to key opponents such as India
and Brazil. It would certainly poison the international climate for
some time to come and would also reduce the credibility of the U.S. in
GATT, because some of these measures would violate the spirit if not
the letter of the general agreement.
112
2. The "Minimum Standards for All"Approach
The other obvious alternative for the new code is to negotiate
rather low standards of protection which as many countries as possible
can underwrite. A least common denominator would produce stan-
dards that might be a little higher than the current laws of many
NICs/LDCs but would be significantly lower than Western standards.
Such a code would miss the aim of the Uruguay Round just as would
an OECD-exclusive one. The inefficacy of low standards with wide
participation has been demonstrated by WIPO during the last decades.
The code would not only be useless, it would also render future im-
provements difficult. The WIPO experience has taught that subse-
quent upgrading can be tedious to impossible. Moreover, because
one might expect, countries like Italy, France and West Germany are also listed with several
complaints. They rank higher than countries like Iran, Spain or even Panama. The reason is that
the survey lists only the number of complaints without taking into account the actual trade
volume. If 10,000 U.S. firms engage in trade with West Germany and five report inadequacies,
this equals 0.5 per thousand. However, if 100 firms trade with Panama and two report inadequa.
cies, this equals five percent. The report thus simply compares the figures of five and two, without
showing the larger pictur Table 4-10 on pp. 4-16 to 4-17 of the 1987 ITC Survey is better suited
to demonstrate the potential benefit that can be expected from improved IP protection in other
OECD countries, because it lists the estimated losses per country and thus does take into account
the volume of trade.
111. See sup note 97.
112. See infic notes 263-73 and accompanying text.
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GATT members would be busy negotiating the minimum code, they
would be unable to focus on drafting provisions for more substantial
IP protection. Finally, such a code would take the present momentum
out of international IP negotiations, and a new approach could not be
launched until a few years of experience with the low-standard GATT
code would have proved its uselessness.
3. The Two-tiered Approach
A combination of both of the above strategies might look like the
logical outcome. However, it should be obvious that a two-tiered ap-
proach cannot combine the advantages of broad membership and
highest standards. It would bind only the OECD countries to the high
standards and would codify and consolidate the claims of the NICs/
LDCs to special and differential treatment, thus becoming an impor-
tant precedent for derogation from the most favored nation (MFN)
principle. Furthermore, there are hardly any possibilities to induce a
country to elect the more restrictive track.1 13.
Automatic graduation clauses might be a solution, but if they are
sufficiently strict they may not be accepted by the NICs/LDCs.
Moreover, different treatment for different developing countries is usu-
ally perceived as discriminatory. On the other hand, a general gradua-
tion clause, such as one that would require all signatories to bring their
IP laws into conformance with a higher standard within 15 years, is
not much more than a legalization of present practices with an agree-
ment to talk again later.
4. The "High Standards for the Many" Approach
The best available compromise seems to be to draft a code with
high standards but not as high as existing Western levels of protection.
In particular, with respect to shorter protection periods, the WICs
should be able to make some concessions. For example, if software is
going to be protected by way of copyright, it would be no problem to
reduce the protection period from 50 to 20 years. Given the present
speed of development in this market, a program ceases to be economi-
113. Reichman, supra note 6, at 27, suggests that the countries in the lower track should not
have the rights to export to the markets of the high-track countries and the international mar-
kets. Only graduation to full membership in the high-track should permit exportation as a matter
of right. While this would be an inducement to change tracks, it is unrealistic for obvious rea-
sons. The denial of the right to export on the basis of inadequate IP protection would violate the
existing principles of national treatment and MFN of the GAT and the WIPO conventions. It
could thus not be enforced against non-signatories of the new code and would actually depend on
some form of voluntary restraint agreement by low-track countries, laid down in the new code.
However, countries like Brazil and India, which are currently exporting their pirated goods all
over the world, will not sign a code prohibiting such exportation in the future.
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cally exploitable after less than 20 years anyway, but it can still serve
educational purposes and provide a basis for R & D. In addition, any
agreement should address the concerns of the NICs/LDCs regarding
compulsory licensing and forfeiture in cases of non-working and other
abuse by copyright holders.
Such a code should be attractive on its own to a significant number
of countries because it certifies that their present practices are con-
forming or can be easily upgraded to the internationally-required level.
Certain concessions and some carefully applied threats or sanctions
should be able to persuade quite a few more countries to join.
5. Existing Proposals Concerning Material and
Procedural Provisions
A number of proposals have been made by OECD governments
and industry organizations. Two elements should be distinguished: (1)
formal rules about the protectable subject matter, domestic means of
enforcement, domestic procedural requirements, international dispute
settlement, etc., and (2) substantial rules such as those concerning
minimum periods of protection or minimum penalties for pirates. All
proposals made so far differ slightly in their material provisions. As
far as formal rules are concerned, differences are more substantial.
For the purposes of this article, it will be sufficient to suggest provi-
sions that should ideally be contained in the code and indicate which
governments or industry groups have already expressed their support.
First of all, the code should cover all IP rights and form a frame-
work or checklist for the national laws to be adopted or modified sub-
sequently. It should explicitly regulate the patentability of process
and product for pharmaceuticals, chemicals and pesticides. 11 4 Equally
desirable is the patentability of plants, microorganisms, and biotechno-
logical and microbiological processes. 115 Copyright should explicitly
be extended to software, 116 unless a sui generis protection is provided.
Furthermore, semiconductor maskworks should be regulated."1 7 Min-
114. This is supported by the U.S. Government. See Kastenmeier & Beier, International
Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285
(1989). The EC also supports this position, see EC Negotiating Position on Intellectual Property
Questions within the Uruguay Round Framework, Europe Documents No. 1522, at 5 (July 29,
1988), as do business organizations in the United States, EC and Japan, see IPC/Keidanren/
UNICE, supra note 8, at 32.
115. This is supported by the U.S. See Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposal for a
GATT Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property, 22 VAxu). J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1989). It is opposed, however, by the EC Com-
mission, see Europe Documents No. 1522, at 5 (July 29, 1988).
116. See Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 115.
117. This is supported by the U.S. government (see Kunz.Hallstein, supra note 115); the EC
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imum standards should be laid down for all forms of IP rights, includ-
ing neighboring rights, appellations of origin and protection against
acts which are contrary to honest business practices (protection of
trade secrets).
Secondly, the code should be "open"; i.e., it should be a living doc-
ument that automatically covers new forms of technology or creativ-
ity.118 The alternative to instant coverage of new forms of innovation
would be a "review clause"' 1 9 providing for frequent review and rene-
gotiation. The latter solution would create the continuous problem of
convincing unwilling countries whenever protection is sought for a
new technological innovation.
Thirdly, the code should prescribe minimum standards for admin-
istrative and judicial protection of IP owners on the domestic level.
All countries should be obligated to provide four forms of domestic
protection: (1) internal measures against pirates based in that country;
(2) border measures against products being exported by pirates from
that country; (3) border measures against products being imported
into that country; and (4) internal measures against imported products
already processed by customs and placed on the markets.
These standards must begin by listing the parties that should have
a right of action (IP owner, licensee, importer, ex officio, etc.). They
have to include the relevant forms of infringement that give a right of
action (i.e., a definition of pirating). Provisions for preliminary injunc-
tions should follow, based on the likelihood of success, the immediate
need, and the balancing of the interests of applicant and defendant.
1 20
General rules for administrative procedures should provide for
timely, non-discriminatory, fair procedures, respecting fundamental
due process rules (such as right to be heard, fair and effective opportu-
nities to present evidence and arguments, 21 the right to legal counsel,
etc.) and resulting in reasoned determinations against which judicial
remedies are possible.
During the entire period of determination and judicial examina-
Commission (see Europe Documents No. 1522, at 3 (July 29, 1988)) and the western industry
organizations (see IPC/Keidanren/UNICE, supra note 8, at 70).
118. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1372 (Nov. 4, 1987).
119. This was suggested by the EC Commission. See Europe Documents No. 1522, at 3 (July
29, 1988).
120. This is demanded by IP industries. See EPC/Keidanren/UNICE, supra note 8, at 94.
The EC Commission proposal correctly demands the deposit of security in these cases to prevent
the abuse of such procedural rights and to guarantee damages for the defendant in case of unjus-
tified complaints. See Europe Documents No. 1482, at 3 (Dec. 4, 1987).
121. A problem results from the U.S. demand that compulsory discovery procedures should
be included because this concept is foreign to the legal traditions of many European countries.
See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1372 (Nov. 4, 1987).
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tion, the entry or sale of the products should be suspended. If the final
determination finds violations of IP rights, the products should be for-
feited and destroyed or otherwise prevented from entering the business
cycle.1 22 If past violations are found, the IP owner should have an
enforceable right to damages. In addition, civil and criminal sanctions
comparable to those for cases of theft or fraud (large fines or prison
sentences) should be introduced as deterrents.
12 3
All signatories of the new code should be obligated to publish all
domestic IP laws and regulations, and to provide additional informa-
tion if requested by other signatories in order to demonstrate their ob-
servation of the code requirements. In addition, it has been suggested
that a multinational surveillance body should be created, comparable
to the Customs Cooperation Council.1 24 This organization would be
charged with the task of collecting, publishing and supervising na-
tional laws and practices and should have the right to demand infor-
mation from signatories and even to initiate GATT-level proceedings
in case of violations. To avoid the creation of yet another interna-
tional organization struggling for competence and jurisdiction in this
area, the surveillance body should function like a conference compris-
ing GATT and WIPO experts.
As far as international enforcement is concerned, the code should
first of all provide a mechanism for consultations and dispute settle-
ment if one signatory feels that its IP owners are not adequately pro-
tected in another member state. This mechanism should be available
in case of violations of IP rights, or nullification and impairment of
benefits accruing to a signatory, or impediment of the objectives of the
code.125 If consultations do not lead to a rapid settlement of the dis-
pute, the party should have a right to a panel under rules similar to the
Tokyo Round side-codes and the GATT, as improved in the ongoing
Uruguay Round.1 26 Private parties should have the right to petition
their own governments for relief, but otherwise the code would not be
122. This is being demanded by IP industries. See IPC/Keidanren/UNICE, supra note 8, at
93.
123. Supported, e.g., by Australia and the Nordic countries. News of the Uruguay Round,
GATT Publication No. 90-0029 (Jan, 11, 1990), at 15.
124. E.g., by the West German Government. See Kretschmer, GA 7T und gewerblicher
Rechtrschutz, 1988 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT: ZEITSCHRIFr DER
DEtrcHEN VEREINIGOUNG FOR GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, IN-
TERNATIONALER TEEL 186, 187.
125. This is being demanded by the U.S. Government. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1371
(Nov. 4, 1987).
126. This is supported by all sides.
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directly applicable.1 27 Panels should consist of independent experts
rather than government representatives.
On the general level it has been demanded that the code should
provide a substantial link to the GATT and thus clarify that violations
of the code may justify withdrawal of GATT concessions. 128 The
guiding principles of GATT, in particular the MFN clause and the
principle of national treatment, should equally apply under the code.
Finally, it has been suggested that the code should make ratification of
the Paris and Berne Conventions in their latest revisions
mandatory.1 29 Such a provision would be a friendly gesture towards
WIPO, but it is not necessary from the point of view of minimum
standards of protection, because the GATT code would contain higher
standards.
A "strategy of the NICs/LDCs" as such does not exist. The inter-
ests of the countries in this large group vary considerably. However,
several states have expressed strong opposition to: (1) the start of a
new Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN);130 (2) the inclusion of
such topics as services and intellectual property in the new Round;1
31
and (3) the drafting of mandatory minimum standards for IP.
The most important "opposition leaders" are India and Brazil.
Both countries are relatively content with the situation as it is. On the
one hand, they have the largest pirating industries in the world and
very low levels of IP protection, especially for foreigners.' 32 On the
other hand, most of their import tariffs are not yet under any interna-
tional bindings. Both countries seem to fear that a new MTN could
only be to their disadvantage.
The major proposals from the developing countries can be summa-
rized as follows: The more advanced countries agree that the general
principles of the GATT, namely transparency, national treatment,
most-favored-nation treatment and international cooperation, should
apply to the new code. Their proposals by now include rules on inter-
nal measures and border measures, principles of multinational dispute
127. This is supported by the EC Commission. See Europe Documents No. 1522, at 3 (July
29, 1988).
128. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1372 (Nov. 4, 1987); see also Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra
note 57, at 40. Switzerland has gone so far as to suggest that the IP code should be integrated as
a part V of the GATT itself. News of the Uruguay Round, GATT Publication No. 90-0751
(June 1, 1990), at 8.
129. The EC Commission has stated this. See Europe Documents No. 1522, at 4 (July 28,
1988).
130. See S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 13.
131. Id. at 14, 45.
132. India is not even a member of the Paris Union. See WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION,
supra note 73, at 15.
1353
Michigan Journal of International Law
settlement, and reasonable standards for the IP rights to be provided.
Their claims to transitionals arrangements for bringing laws into line
with the general standards, technical assistance programs and the
grant of financial resources for the introduction of better IP protection
have become realistic and reasonable. However, they still insist that
developing countries should enjoy (permanent) special and more
favorable treatment, such as a reduction in the duration of patents and
flexibility in the levels of the standards themselves. A draft proposal
by fourteen developing countries 133 specifically demands that the sig-
natories of the new code should retain the sovereign right to determine
the level and scope of protection of IP rights, "in particular in sectors
of special public concern such as health, nutrition, agriculture and na-
tional security." 134 On the other hand, provisions prohibiting unilat-
eral measures in retaliation for infringements of the new code and a
rapid and effective dispute settlement procedure have also been de-
manded. 135 These concerns of the NICs/LICs must be kept in mind
by Western negotiators when offering "bait" and package-deal-type
proposals to obtain support for their more stringent IP-code drafts
from as many countries as possible.
If the negotiators agree on a package deal (i.e., a multilateral obli-
gation for several countries to make certain concessions in exchange
for different concessions by other countries) this will probably be done
in the form of an international agreement obligating its signatories to
enter simultaneously into a whole new set of side-codes for IP, textiles,
agriculture and other matters.
IV. WICs vs. NICs/LDCs - A DISCUSSION OF THE
ARGUMENTS
Since IP became a major issue in international trade relations a few
years ago, supporters of the position taken by the NICs/LDCs have
presented a considerable number of arguments against Western efforts
to extend traditional western concepts for the protection of IP to the
rest of the world. Western politicians and economists have challenged
and refuted some but not all of these arguments. Four areas of contro-
versy shall be examined herein: the sovereign right of a state to decide
not to protect IP; economic disadvantages of introducing a system of
133. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Tanzania, Uruguay and Zimbabwe.
134. See News of Uruguay Round, GATT Publication No. 90-0751 (June 1, 1990), at 9.
135. Al See also the report on a proposal from Mexico in News of the Uruguay Round,
GATT Publcation No. 90-0248 (Feb. 23, 1990), at 5; Focus, GATT Newsletter No. 69 (Mar.
1990), at 5.
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IP protection; political arguments against the introduction of such a
system; and arguments against GATT as a forum for IP protection.
A. Protection of Intellectual Property: A Question of Sovereignty
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, which is considered to be an
authoritative and binding interpretation 36 of the Charter of the
United Nations, declares the following "Principle of Equal Rights
And Self-Determination of Peoples":
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the
right freely to determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter.1
37
On the basis of a general practice, supported by an opiniojuris as
reflected in the Friendly Relations Declaration, it has become gener-
ally accepted that every state is entitled under international law to
freely select its economic order. 3 This is explicitly affirmed by article
1 of the non-binding Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States:
Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to chose its economic
system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance
with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or
threat in any form whatsoever.
139
It has been argued that the present efforts by the WICs, particu-
larly the U.S., are just attempts to maintain their international eco-
nomic leadership by translating their domestic provisions on IP
protection into international standards, and that this negates the free-
dom of the NICs/LDCs to select their political and economic systems
by sovereign decisions.14'
The NICs/LDCs claim the right to value the interests of society as
a whole and their vast masses of impoverished consumers over the
interests of a handful of wealthy IP owners. One of the roots of this
attitude can be seen in attempts of the United Nations Conference on
136. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter Friendly Relations
Declarations]; see also A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 274 n.4 (3d
ed. 1984).
137. See Friendly Relations Declarations, supra note 136.
138. See A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, supra note 136, at 812.
139. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
140. See Primo Braga, supra note 108.
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Trade and Development (UNCTAD), beginning in the mid-1970s, to
prescribe a Code of Conduct for the International Transfer of Tech-
nology.1 41 Although this code was opposed by most Western coun-
tries and never got beyond the negotiating table, it has served as a
model for domestic laws of a number of NICs/LDCs. 42 Their pri-
mary goal today is to place IP from developed countries in the public
domain and reduce control and restrictions on the use of technological
information. 
1 43
The NICs/LDCs rely in part on the fact that norms of general
international law permit even deliberate expropriation and nationali-
zation of property of aliens, if this is in the public interest, non-dis-
criminatory and adequately compensated. 144 They claim that since
pirating is done by private individuals who are neither authorized nor
encouraged by the state, the latter cannot be held responsible in any
way. Compensation or damages cannot be demanded and trade sanc-
tions may not be taken just because a NIC/LDC refuses to copy the
laws of the most highly industrialized nations in the world. In any
case, non-protection of IP, as long as it is done in a nondiscriminatory
fashion, does not violate existing WIPO treaties, which only demand
the granting of national treatment to foreigners.
Another argument of the NICs/LDCs is their need to gain a fair
share of the world economy before new technologies, in particular
robotics, allow the WICs to make up for the present comparative ad-
vantage of cheaper labor in the NICs/LDCs and impose structural
adjustment costs on them even in traditionally labor intensive areas
such as textiles.145
In response to the Western argument that non-protection of IP
creates competitive advantages and distorts trade, NICs/LDCs have
cited other governmental interventions which distort trade to the same
or even higher degrees: provision of educational systems to train a
highly-skilled work force; construction of roads, railroads, ports and
other transport facilities; supply of subsidized energy (e.g. from nu-
clear power plants); tax breaks for "infant industries"; toleration of
141. 19 I.L.M. 773 (1980).
142. E.g., India substantially reduced its protection of patents in 1970. See Gadbaw &
Kenny, India, in Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 200 n.25 [hereinafter Gadbaw & Kenny].
143. See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 8.
144. See A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, supra note 136, at 805-07, 812-13; the "Hull Formula"
is reproduced on 807 n.6: "We recognize the right of any country to expropriate property... so
long as the taking is nondiscriminatory, for a public purpose and accompanied by prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation. In our view these are the minimum standards under interna-
tional law." The Hull Formula can be considered to be a generally accepted rule of international
law. Id
145. See Primo Braga, supra note 108.
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mergers and monopolization; low levels of income and sales taxes etc.
The NICs/LDCs claim that these interventions are not considered un-
fair by the WICs, only because the latter have always engaged in these
practices themselves and want to continue using them.
At bottom, the question is whether IP is really a Western concept,
foreign to the culture of many NICs/LDCs, which has simply been
forced upon them by the WICs for egotistic economic motives.
Western authors have claimed that IP is a right just like normal
property rights, 146 or even a human right in a narrow sense. They
have relied on provisions such as article 27(2) of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights ("Everyone has the right to the protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary,
or artistic production of which he is the author"1 47) as well as article
15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which states:
1. The States Parties to the present Convention recognize the right of
everyone:... (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and mate-
rial interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production
of which he is the author."
148
However, the Universal Declaration, like most General Assembly dec-
larations, does not have binding effect as such. Secondly, the wording
of these documents does not require that all areas of IP rights be pro-
tected all over the world. NICs/LDCs could claim that limited excep-
tions, such as nonpatentability of pharmaceuticals, can be justified by
superior public interests. Finally, it can be argued that the two docu-
ments were adopted at a time when most members of the United Na-
tions were WICs and most of what are now NICs and LDCs were still
colonies of the WICs. It was thus not surprising that the cultural con-
cepts of the WICs are embodied in these documents.
Supporters of the NICs/LDCs can further argue that in the
meantime international law may have changed. A more contempo-
rary point of view may be reflected in the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States (especially in articles 2(I), 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, and
24),149 which was adopted in 1975, at a time when most former colo-
146. See Reichman, supra note 6, at 10-15.
147. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 41 (1948).
148. Adopted Dec. 19, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, G.A.Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
149. Article 13(2) is the provision most clearly applicable to the present issue:
All States should promote international scientific and technological co-operation and the
transfer of technology, with proper regard for all legitimate interests including, inter alia,
the rights and duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of technology. In particular, the
States should facilitate the access of developing countries to the achievements of modern
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nies had achieved independence. This Charter may better reflect the
different cultural values of the NICs/LDCs.
However, a forceful argument for the WICs is the fact that all
"major target countries" recognize some forms of IP and are protect-
ing it at least if it is deemed beneficial to their own industries. 50 It
may well be that the governments in the NICs/LDCs merely engage
in a balancing test: are the benefits that piracy brings to their national
economies outweighed by the potential benefits associated with the
provision of IP protection? 15 More recently, they have begun to in-
clude in their balancing test the avoidance of potential losses due to
termination of GSP status 52 and other trade sanctions.
On the other hand, Oddi claims that all countries, developing as
well as developed, exclude certain classes of inventions from patent
protection 53 and thus engage in the same balancing test. Reichman
declares that "[t]he literature describing the failure of the industrial-
ized countries to live up to their own intellectual property' standards
would fill a sizeable library"' 54 and adds examples of inadequate pro-
tection in Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union and primarily the U.S.'
55
This purportedly shows that the claim of many authors in support of
the Western position-that IP as such is a "natural right" like tangible
property ownership-is simply not true.
B. Economic Arguments
Quite a number of arguments have been made concerning the ques-
tion of whether it is economically profitable for a country to introduce
a system of IP protection. The answer depends strongly on the indi-
vidual situation of the country, considering such factors as: popula-
science and technology, the transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous technology
for the benefit of the developing countries ....
See supra note 141.
150. See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 17-18.
151. 1d
152. GSP refers to the General System of Preferences under which WICs unilaterally permit
customs duty free access of most products coming from NICs/LDCs. See J. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 278
(1989).
153. Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?
1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 856-57.
154. See Reichman, supra note 6, at 36.
155. Id. at 36-37; Reichman's examples of problems with U.S. laws are (1) protection of
moral rights as required since the United States joined the Berne Convention; (2) discriminatory
border measures against foreign patentees under section 337; (3) dilution of rights of priority in
violation of the Paris Convention; (4) refusal to provide sui generis design protection, despite an
implicit duty under the Berne Convention; (5) no public performance right available for sound
recordings.
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tion; rates of unemployment and underemployment; per capita
income; existing infrastructure; size and type of domestic industries;
size of pirating industries; major exports and export markets; depen-
dence on foreign IP; prospects of losing GSP status or being subjected
to other trade sanctions; presence of subsidiaries of multinational cor-
porations; potential for further foreign direct investment; and other
issues.
However, a few considerations are true for all NICs/LDCs. First,
I shall examine the question of whether, purely from a cost perspec-
tive, developing countries should protect IP at all. Secondly, I will
address the argument that granting monopoly rights is neither the
only nor the best way to encourage R & D and creativity. Finally, the
potential benefits of IP protection will be considered.
1. The Cost of IP Protection for Developing Countries
It has been argued that efficient IP registration and enforcement
offices are unavailable to NICs/LDCs because of the high cost and the
lack of required expertise.' 56 These countries are faced with the
choice of either requiring their own examinations of novelty, non-obvi-
ousness, etc. for all patent, trademark and related applications, or
mandating this only for domestic applicants while granting it to for-
eigners on the basis of their home country IP rights. In the former
instance, the NIC/LDC may be faced with unmanageable costs and a
lack of professionalism. Vaitsos cites the example of Brazil, which re-
quired prior examinations and had a backlog of 400,000 pending pat-
ent applications (not counting other IP rights) in 1970.157
If NICs/LDCs do not require additional examinations, the
problems with cost and expertise may not be so urgent. However,
they would then depend heavily on the decisions regarding novelty,
etc. made elsewhere. This would place the NICs/LDCs in a new form
of quasi-colonial dependency and may lead to a considerable degree of
"economic arbitrariness."' 58 Vaitsos claims that the majority of pat-
ents are declared invalid in U.S. courts if challenged by competitors;
this is intended to show how arbitrary the initial decision to grant the
patent was.159 However, Vaitsos' figure of an 89% invalidation rate
between 1941 and 1945 is not only outdated, it is based only on deci-
sions of Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court (i.e., on appel-
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late decisions). It certainly does not adequately reflect the situation in
courts of first instance.
One reply concerning the lack of expertise is that NICs/LDCs will
never gain expertise in the field if they do not start with adequate pro-
tection of IP rights. Furthermore, several WICs, in particular the
U.S., have already started programs of training and education for for-
eign customs and other government officials to increase awareness of
the advantages of IP protection. At the same time, these programs
will transfer know-how for the preparation and implementation of ad-
equate and effective laws and administrative mechanisms.6 This type
of support can certainly be increased and does not entail costs for the
NICs/LDCs.1
61
As to the costs of introducing a system of IP protection, the WICs
have again offered their help. Governments of NICs/LDCs should
also be aware of the income generated from patent fees. As far as
applications from foreign firms and individuals are concerned, these
fees can be collected in precious foreign exchange. Once the system is
established and the start-up costs are paid, application fees may even
generate a net profit for the government.
The monopoly position granted by the IP rights to the innovator
allows her to charge consumers monopoly prices well above competi-
tive market rates. This "cost on society"' 62 is generally viewed as un-
desirable but necessary to create incentives for R & D and creativity.
These provide societal benefits which supposedly outweigh consumer
costs, at least in the long run. This theory of cost and benefit of IP
protection has been criticized because it does not take into account the
separation of societies by political boundaries. NICs/LDCs claim that
a worldwide test may well find net benefits; however, costs and benefits
are not evenly distributed among the political entities. They say that
their consumers have to bear the same or even a larger share of the
cost, while their industries and individual innovators, due to the lower
level of development and specialization, cannot sufficiently transform
the incentives into increased R & D and creativity.1 63 In particular, it
has been claimed that multinational firms have repeatedly abused the
monopoly rights granted by NICs/LDCs by exorbitant overpricing of
up to 6500% over prices offered by various producers around the
160. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 45-46.
161. See infra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
162. See MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 5, at 101.
163. Concerning the question of increased domestic R&D in NICs/LDCs after introduction
of adequate IP protection, see infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
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world not covered by patents. 164
Two responses to these accusations shall be made. First, relatively
high monopoly profits are frequently necessary for the innovator to
compensate for her risks. In the area of patents, it is estimated that,
on the average, less than 10% of all innovative efforts result in com-
mercially exploitable inventions. Since there is no way to identify the
successful projects in advance, future market conditions are always
uncertain, and R & D costs are skyrocketing in particular in high-tech
areas, considerable incentives are required.165
Second, there are less burdensome measures to protect consumers
against exploitation and ruthless overpricing by IP owners. Many
countries have introduced price controls for sensitive products such as
pharmaceuticals, agro-chemicals and food. Overpricing beyond a cer-
tain percentage could be regarded as abuse of the IP right and be sanc-
tioned by compulsory licensing of competitors or even forfeiture of the
patent. Complete refusal of patent protection is thus not only unnec-
essary and disproportionate, it also entails significant disadvantages
concerning technology transfer and incentives for domestic R & D and
creativity. 166
The introduction of adequate protection of IP in NICs/LDCs will
entail a number of immediate and mid-range effects on the domestic
pirating industries. First of all, they will either have to close down or
obtain licenses for the IP they are using. Small and/or inefficient firms
are more likely to give up. This will result in increased unemploy-
ment. Larger and/or more efficient firms can probably adjust and con-
tinue in their line of business.1 67 However, their factor costs will rise
due to the obligation to pay royalties to the IP owner. More likely, the
ex-pirates can swallow part of these increased costs by accepting lower
margins of profit. The rest will have to be passed on to the customers.
This will make it harder for the firms to compete in all three types of
markets (domestic, home country of the IP owner and third countries)
and sales will be lost domestically and abroad. This will affect the
export earnings of the country.
164. See Vaitsos, supra note 156, at 85-86, reproducing an official study published by the
Instituto de Comercio Exterior of the Colombian Government; data is based on 1968 prices of
protected American intermediate pharmaceutical products when imported by Colombia. Prelim-
inary research supposedly produced similar results for imports by Peru and Chile. According to
the author, these studies resulted in a modification of U.S. Government rules for the pricing of
pharmaceutical products purchased through Agency for International Development loans in
Latin America.
165. See MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 5, at 100-01.
166. See infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
167. See in particular the suggestion infra note 224, and accompanying text.
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Thirdly, most of the newly-protected IP rights will be held by IP
owners in WICs. Therefore, the country is faced with increased roy-
alty transfers to WICs, which will have to be paid in convertible cur-
rency. This is particularly difficult for countries with soft currencies
and heavy international debts, which are already struggling with their
international obligations to service their loans.
In the mid- to long-run these costs may be outweighed by the bene-
fits to be obtained from enhanced IP protection. However, some
NICs, and to a lesser degree certain LDCs, depend heavily on pirating
industries at present, and their economic situation is so fragile that the
WICs will have to allow phase-in periods and provide financial help if
serious economic and political difficulties are to be avoided.
2. The Cost of Possible Trade Sanctions
There are "costs" of inadequate IP protection which were not
taken into account by most older studies: trade sanctions by the WICs
against products and services from the NICs/LDCs may place heavy
financial burdens on the latter.168 The danger of protectionism is par-
ticularly urgent in the U.S. Although in 1989 the annual trade deficit
of the U.S. declined in comparison to previous years, 169 pessimists
have already predicted a deficit of up to $200 billion for 1990.170 Until
the late 1970s, surplusses in the U.S. balance of service transactions of
up to $30 billion or more had served to compensate for the deficit in
trade of goods. Although the balance of service transactions still pro-
duced a surplus of $1.5 billion in the first quarter of 1989, the balance
in the second quarter was negative for the first time in thirty years.
1 71
The foreign debt of the U.S. has grown to over $500 billion. 172 With
these figures published in the newspapers and the $50 billion estimate
of the 1987 ITC Survey on the table, protectionist pressure in Con-
gress could do significant harm to world trade if the Uruguay Round
168. See Primo Braga, supra note 108, who cites the examples of recent U.S. actions against
Korea, Taiwan and Brazil, and EC actions against Indonesia.
169. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 19, 1990, at 15, reports the figures of the Bureau
of the Census/U.S. Commerce Department: 1987: 152.1 billion U.S. dollars; 1988: 118.6 billion
U.S. dollars; 1989 108.6 billion U.S. dollars. The latest figures available to the author were
published by THE ECONOMIST, July 28, 1990, at 104. In the twelve-month period from July 1989
to June 1990, the trade deficit has declined to $105.3 billion. This slow decline is likely to con-
tinue for a number of reasons, most importantly the current weakness of the U.S. dollar in inter-
national money markets as compared to other major currencies (Yen, Deutsche Mark, ECU,
etc.), which makes imports from these countries more expensive for U.S. consumers.
170. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept, 15, 1989, at 18; see also Frankfurter Allegemeine
Zeitung, Dec. 16, 1989, at 13; Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, Jan. 18, 1990, at 11, where the
rising deficit of the last quarter of 1989 is noted.
171. Id. The deficit was reported at $176 million.
172. Id.
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and other measures taken by the U.S. government do not bring fast
and noteworthy changes in worldwide protection of U.S.-owned IP.
3. Antitrust Concerns Against Monopoly Rights
Patents and other IP rights are a lawful way of acquiring a monop-
oly position. However, authors supporting the position of the NICs/
LDCs have argued that if these countries decide to protect IP at all,
they should select a different system which does not entail the eco-
nomic inefficiencies of monopoly rights.
The extent of monopoly power in a given case depends on several
factors. The availability of substitute products which are not pro-
tected by IP rights or protected for competitors, along with the elastic-
ity of demand, will determine whether customers can evade overpriced
goods. Certain aspects of IP laws beyond the mere length of protec-
tion affect the value of laws to the innovator. For example, if licensing
of surrounding patents is easy, a firm might completely "fence in" a
technology by securing enough patents in one line of business.17 3 Sim-
ilarly, if licensing of improvement patents is encouraged, the life of a
patent can be extended by continually improving a technology and
obtaining patents for these innovations.
The power inherent in monopoly positions may induce profit-max-
imizing practices by the monopolist, which entail significant economic
inefficiencies in addition to the problem of higher consumer prices dis-
cussed above. In extreme cases, the problems associated with power-
ful monopolies and cartels may outweigh the benefits of more
innovation and direct investment. 174 These problems include price fix-
ing, predatory and discriminatory pricing, refusals to deal (exclusive
dealing, territorial and customer restraints, boycotts), market division,
tying arrangements, use restriction and coercion of public
authorities. 175
The availability and efficiency of antitrust proceedings and reme-
dies to consumers, competitors and government agencies--compul-
sory licensing or forfeiture of the IP right, criminal penalties against
the innovator/licensee, civil remedies allowing treble damages, cease
and desist orders, break-ups of too-powerful conglomerates-are
173. See, e.g., the "United Shoe" decision (United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110
F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)) where three manufacturers
of different shoe making machines had merged and subsequently improved their machines to the
point where they held over 2000 patents. This gave them a secured market share of between 75
and 95%.
174. A thorough analysis of antitrust problems is beyond the scope of this paper. For expla-
nations, examples and cases see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRusT LAW (1978).
175. See also Vaitsos, supra note 156, at 84-85.
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therefore inseparably linked with the question of how much IP protec-
tion should be granted.
As the monopoly profits of the innovator and the dead-weight
losses caused by the abuse of monopoly power have to be borne by
society (consumers and competitors), it would be ideal if the IP pro-
tection was just long and strong enough to allow the innovator to
regain her expenses and a reasonable profit. For several reasons, how-
ever, it is not feasible to assign individualized protection periods and
conditions to each and every IP application.
First of all, the administrative effort and costs in determining the
applicable period and conditions for hundreds of thousands of applica-
tions per year would be tremendous. In addition, there is no reliable
data to establish the just return of an innovation. If the period of pro-
tection depends on the expenses borne by the inventor/creator, she has
little incentive to keep her costs low; i.e., inventive activity will be less
economical (the "Lear-Jet Syndrome") and/or inventors will claim ex-
aggerated expenses. Third, the risks involved in inventive/creative ac-
tivity varies from branch to branch, even from product line to product
line, and of course from year to year. It is impossible to determine the
"reasonable" profit necessary to compensate for the risks of each indi-
vidual innovation.
The existing IP laws therefore apply standardized periods and con-
ditions of protection. Patents are generally protected for 15 to 20
years (depending on the national laws); trademarks are usually pro-
tected for 5 to 10 years, although re-registration is possible; copyrights
normally last for the life of the author plus 50 years, or just 50 years in
the case of legal persons. As far as conditions of protection are con-
cerned, the right is usually exclusive and allows all forms of economic
exploitation including: working by the innovator, licensing to several
users (in the same or in different geographic areas), exclusive licensing,
conditional licensing (with requirements like exclusive or non-exclu-
sive "grant-back" of any improvement patents). Obviously these stan-
dardized rules cannot deal with the particular problems of monopoly
power associated with specific products, firms, industries, and geo-
graphic areas.
The two alternatives to the provision of monopoly rights are the
free market system of trade secrecy and the socialist model of state-
financed R & D. They have different but equally significant disadvan-
tages in their pure forms. However, it seems possible to combine trade
secrecy, state-financed R & D, and IP monopoly rights in a way that
eliminates most disadvantages while preserving a high level of incen-
tives for innovators.
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A great many inventions would occur under the free market sys-
tem without any IP protection, as long as certain "ground rules" of a
healthy economy are present. The time lags in imitation, i.e., the abil-
ity of the innovator to protect her creation by trade secrecy, will in
many cases suffice for the originator to recoup her costs plus a profit.
Even if an invention is not or cannot be kept secret, competitors will
often lack the know-how, production facilities, managerial experience,
and distribution channels necessary to effectively threaten the position
of the innovator in the short run. Furthermore, at least in highly con-
centrated industries where only a few firms are competing, the imita-
tors might follow a profit-maximizing pricing strategy that allows all
market participants to make a profit. Moreover, numerous advantages
in innovative leadership will encourage creativity, such as marketing
advantages to being "first," company image, and the importance of
getting the initial market share.
In certain situations, however, these incentives will not suffice. In
a perfectly competitive market, where imitation is easy and many
firms are competing, creativity will not pay without protection.1 76 The
same is true for products and branches where the costs of development
are very high and profits are known to be low. 177 Absent protection,
small firms and individual innovators will always find it hard to com-
pete with the market-dominating firms. Finally, high-risk develop-
ments, in particular radically new technologies with uncertain chances
of success, require additional incentives. 78 A combination of IP pro-
tection and government sponsorship of innovative activities could the-
oretically provide such incentives in these areas.
On the other hand, such a combined approach is not without flaws.
First of all, the interdependence in world trade and every state's inter-
est to participate in it leaves it quite doubtful that one state or a small
group could decide not to protect certain forms of IP and instead leave
the incentives for innovation to free market forces. These states would
become a safe haven for pirating industries, and subsequently trade
sanctions and threats would be applied by the other countries. This
may eventually be the answer to the question of whether IP protection
should be a matter of sovereignty and left to the individual decision of
each state: growing economic interdependency is a factor that limits
each state's sovereignty in many respects and in many areas, including
IP protection. Second, the combined approach would still entail some
of the disadvantages of each of the pure forms. Trade secrecy causes
176. Eg., the music and publishing industry, software and industrial designs.
177. Eg. drugs and medical technology for rare diseases.
178. Eg., deep-sea mining, astronautics and chemotherapy.
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inefficiencies and does not prevent monopolization. Protection of
some branches and products but not others may be discriminatory and
arbitrary.
Antitrust laws should prohibit price fixing for products not cov-
ered by IP rights and provide remedies for competitors faced with
predatory or discriminatory pricing of protected products. Territo-
rial- or customer-specific refusals to deal should be prohibited unless
justified by overriding interests. Tying arrangements, i.e., the sale of a
patented and thus monopolized product only in combination with an
unprotected product, should be generally outlawed. When patent ac-
cumulation occurs to the degree that an entire technology is fenced in,
compulsory licensing or even a break-up of the monopolistic firm
should be possible.
In all these cases, procedures should be available not only to gov-
ernment surveillance bodies, but also to competitors and consumer or-
ganizations, to make sure that unlawful practices are detected and
taken care of. Remedies should not be limited to compulsory licensing
or forfeiture of the IP right. Primary remedies should be civil dam-
ages, which are usually sufficient as deterrents and also provide incen-
tives for competitors and consumers to initiate proceedings if
violations become known.
This checklist may sound self-evident to lawyers in Western indus-
trialized countries because the existing laws there fulfil most of these
demands. In the NICs/LDCs, however, the situation is very different.
The legal systems of these countries are a long way from the economi-
cally ideal model of a combination of trade secrecy, state-subsidized
R & D, limited IP monopolies, and antitrust checks and balances.
Sufficient awareness both in the WICs and NICs/LDCs and a willing-
ness to cooperate (including financial help) could nevertheless over-
come this problem, and allow the developing countries to share more
of the benefits of economic growth and prosperity.
4. Benefits of IP Protection
a. Increased Domestic R & D and Creativity
Protection of IP is an essential tool to encourage domestic R & D
and creativity. This may not be so apparent for the least developed
countries, but inventors from NICs like India and Brazil are produc-
ing important innovations at least in certain lines of business. Fur-
thermore, IP is more than patents. Trademark protection is necessary
to encourage domestic producers to establish their own high-quality
brands and to give consumers the security of obtaining good value for
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their money along with safe products. Last but not least, copyrights
are important tools, especially in developing countries, for ensuring a
financial base for domestic performing artists, writers, musicians,
sculptors, and designers. Absent such a protection, artists have an in-
centive to leave their home countries and try to make money abroad,
as soon as they have obtained a certain reputation. IP protection can
thus protect the traditional arts and culture from Westernization and
"brain-drain." Of course, the "brain-drain" effect applies equally to
researchers and inventors.
Proponents of the developing countries' position have argued that
the protection of IP alone will not produce R & D and creativity in the
NICs/LDCs, as long as these countries are struggling with the provi-
sion of such fundamental infrastructural assets as reliable energy and
water supplies, transport facilities (streets, railroads, ports), capital, re-
search facilities, and schools and training centers to educate a skilled
work force. 179 In addition, it has been argued that other economic
policy measures, such as tax incentives, import policy, tariffs, and
rules on employment of foreign experts (double taxation conventions,
work permits, transfer of income, etc.) affect R & D and creativity
more than the protection of IP does.180
However, the necessity to undertake additional measures should
not serve as an excuse to deny protection of IP rights. It is true the
above are cumulative requirements, but apart from a few least devel-
oped countries, most developing nations do have the infrastructure for
a certain level of R & D and creativity, and they will not fully utilize
their economic potential as long as IP is inadequately protected.
Next, it has been claimed that R & D has quite a different struc-
ture in developing countries. While the bulk of R & D efforts is made
by private individuals and firms in the WICs that depend on the incen-
tives of monopoly profits, this is not true for NICs/LDCs. In develop-
ing countries innovative research, if achieved at all, is done to a much
larger degree in laboratories and research institutions owned and/or
financed by the government. These institutions do not depend on mo-
nopoly incentives.
Several replies can be given to this argument. First of all, it is not
surprising that R & D efforts are not made to a larger degree by pri-
vate individuals, because there is no incentive to do so absent adequate
protection of IP. In addition, such an R & D structure may be under-
utilizing the countries' potential and may be inefficient. Better protec-
179. See MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 5, at 97; R. BENKO, supra note 4, at
28.
180. See Vaitsos, supra note 156, at 75.
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tion of IP can improve the present situation. And of course, better IP
protection will also contribute to more domestic R & D efforts by sub-
sidiaries of multinational firms.'81
Another line of reasoning of the NICs/LDCs is the concern that a
newly introduced system of IP protection will almost exclusively bene-
fit foreign multinational firms and their subsidiaries. 8 2 Patent appli-
cations will be filed by foreign firms for inventions already made
elsewhere. Trademarks will be registered by foreign firms or import-
ers but not by domestic producers. Copyrights will be claimed first
and foremost by Western authors and musicians. The WICs are said
to be so much more advanced technologically and experienced in the
marketing and distribution of their products that competitors from de-
veloping countries have little chance of beating them in the innovation
race. If local inventors gain patents and the like, these innovations are
frequently of little economic impact, either because the inventors lack
the know-how, capital, and infrastructure needed to exploit their in-
ventions, 18 3 or because the inventions themselves are less advanced,
labor-intensive products and processes that cannot compete interna-
tionally. 8 4 In addition, it is claimed that foreign-owned patents and
IP rights lead to foreign-owned industries.18 5 The supporters of these
arguments admit, however, that the situation is already different in the
more advanced NICs, such as India, Brazil, and Taiwan. '8 6 And they
have neglected the advantages of foreign direct investment and the
presence of foreign subsidiaries in the form of jobs, taxes, training, and
other economic benefits.
Finally, Oddi cites a study by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights in which domestic holdings of
foreign patents are viewed as claims to future royalties and thus assets
of a country. The study concludes that foreign holdings of domestic
patents would have to be counted among the liabilities of a country
and, therefore, as deductions from national wealth. 8 7 This demon-
181. Vaitsos has claimed additional R&D by subsidiaries of multinational firms in the NICs/
LDCs to be negative, but he overlooks the fact that these firms provide jobs, train people, pay
taxes and contribute to the export earnings of the country in question. See Vaitsos, supra note
158, at 73.
182. See R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 28; Benko, supra note 89, at 225; Primo Braga, supra
note 108, at 8.
183. See Vaitsos, supra note 156, at 73-74.
184. See R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 28.
185. Id. at 79.
186. Id.
187. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS,
85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY No. 15
(Comm. Print 1958) (F. Machulp auth.).
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strates the problem of increasing royalty transfers, whose solution may
require the WICs to compensate the NICs/LDCs in some fashion, at
least in the transitional period until the latter begin to reap sufficient
benefits from increasing domestic R & D and creativity.
b. Increased Worldwide R & D and Creativity
Western economic models show that worldwide R & D and crea-
tivity increases if additional countries protect IP and thus make inno-
vation more profitable. However, the question is whether small
countries with insignificant market shares in world trade can really
make a difference for the cost/benefit ratio of Western IP rights. Vait-
sos sums up this argument:
[I]t is reasonable to assume that the granting of patents by Peru, Turkey
or Indonesia or even by the whole Third World taken together has insig-
nificant effects on the R & D plans of transnational corporations like Du
Pont, Phillips or Mitsubishi, or on governmental spending on science
and technology in, say, the United States or France. Consequently, in-
stead of considering the effects of patents granted by developing coun-
tries on inventive activity per se, we should rather concern ourselves
with such questions as whether they promote or deter foreign invest-
ment, whether they enhance or restrict technology transfer or whether
they affect the terms of trade.1 88
It is true that decisionmakers in large multinational corporations will
not waste their time on computations of possible additional profits due
to improved IP protection in certain least developed countries. How-
ever, the Third World as a whole, and particularly the NICs, are sub-
stantial markets for western products today. Roughly 35-40% of all
U.S. exports go to developing and newly industrialized countries.189
The bulk of these exports are industrial products which benefit from
IP protection. No one would seriously dispute that 40% of one's ex-
ports do influence R & D and investment decisions.
In addition, it should not be forgotten that Third World countries
are particularly important markets for certain types of products. The
market share of the Third World is far above 40% of U.S. exports for
products such as drugs for treatment of tropical diseases and agro-
chemicals for the typical needs of farmers in tropical climates. If these
products do not receive IP protection in the countries for which they
are produced, worldwide R & D efforts will certainly be inhibited.
188. See Vaitsos, supra note 156, at 75.
189. Data from THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1989 and STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE U.S. (108th ed. 1988) and THE EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1988.
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c. Increased Foreign Direct Investment
Adequate protection of IP is becoming increasingly important in
investment decisions of multinational firms, especially in high-tech in-
dustries that depend heavily on IP. It is true that investment will also
depend on factors such as tax incentives, labor laws, and rules on
profit repatriation, but these factors alone will not be sufficient
anymore.
It has been argued that patents may have the effect of blocking
investment, both foreign and national, in developing countries. By
giving a monopoly of production and/or importation to one firm,
these countries effectively discourage all competitors from entering the
market, stopping competition at its source. 90
This view is erroneous, however. As long as a firm has not suc-
ceeded in "fencing in an entire technology," competitors will always
attempt to invent around a patent or find alternative solutions. Other-
wise there could only be one firm per product in the developed coun-
tries, and this is clearly not so. Even if one assumes that competitors
might not be so interested in the market of a developing country that
they take on the additional efforts and costs related to inventing
around an IP right, the NIC/LDC would still have the benefit of at
least one producer for each product, whereas absent IP protection per-
haps no one would start a line of production in that country. Of
course, it can be argued that the IP owner does not have to start pro-
ducing in the developing country, but can supply the market from her
home-base and thus reap monopoly profits without additional invest-
ment. But in that case, there are remedies such as compulsory licens-
ing or even forfeiture of a patent, if the owner does not work or license
it domestically within reasonable time.
d. Improved Access to State-of-the-Art Technology
If IP is not protected adequately, the innovators will attempt to
protect themselves by trade secrecy. Even if a country has effective
laws against industrial espionage and other acts contrary to honest
business practices, a firm will not risk the loss of certain trade secrets
due to production and distribution of its goods unless the market is
very promising. NICs/LDCs, however, are traditionally less attrac-
tive markets due to infrastructural problems, political instability and
low domestic purchasing power. Western IP owners, therefore, tend
to be reluctant to disclose their latest innovations in these countries
and prefer to produce and supply outdated technology, which may
190. See Vaitsos, supra note 156, at 77.
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still suffice for less developed markets but is no longer competitive in
world trade. 19' According to the theory of correlation between tech-
nological revolution and economic prosperity, 92 the NICs/LDCs are
thus placing themselves in an economically disadvantageous position
by not protecting state-of-the-art technology.
It has been argued that there is no guarantee that Western IP own-
ers will make available their latest technologies even if IP protection is
upgraded in the NICs/LDCs. But once again, if an IP owner does not
work or license her patent or other IP right within a reasonable time
where potential licensees are interested, the country in question could
take recourse through compulsory licensing or similar means.
e. Summary of the Economic Prospects
The introduction of IP protection that deserves its name will this
impose significant short-term economic costs on the NICs/LDCs.
93
However, the WICs have offered their assistance, in the form of transi-
tional periods which give those countries enough time to draft ade-
quate laws and set up enforcement mechanisms, while allowing the
pirating industries to adjust to the new situation. In any case, the
long-term benefits of IP protection will outweigh the short-term costs
at least in those countries with a certain minimum level of economic
activity. As far as the least developed nations are concerned, their
prospects for long-term benefits are slim, and the WICs might con-
sider exempting them from an IP code, possibly with a graduation
clause connected to per capita income.
C. Political Arguments
Under certain conditions, a Third World government will not be
ready to introduce IP protection even though it is convinced of its
economic desirability. First, the benefits of IP protection would evolve
gradually and would affect society as a whole, such as through higher
rates of economic growth and the availability of more and better con-
sumer goods. The costs, on the other hand, would be focused on those
that are presently pirating, and would be felt immediately. Pirates,
due to their urgent interest in preventing the introduction of IP pro-
191. See Primo Braga, supra note 108; MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 5, at
106.
192. S. HAFFNER, VON BISMARCK ZU HITLER 84 (1987)
193. See MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 5, at 90-91, 106-07; Chin & Gross-
man, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade 22 (Nov. 1988) (Discussion Papers in
Economics No. 143, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University); R. BENKO, supra note 4, at
28; Primo Braga, supra note 108, at 11.
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tection, would lobby forcefully against it, while the beneficiaries are a
diffuse and unorganized mass with little immediate political clout.194
Secondly, no government likes to be perceived as giving in to foreign
threats,1 95 and some countries are particularly sensitive to pressure by
the U.S.
If one or both of these concerns is very strong in a given country, it
may amount to political suicide for its government to introduce IP
protection subsequent to Western pressure in the Uruguay Round.
This problem should therefore be taken into consideration by Western
negotiators. If substantial offers in related areas are made to the
NICs/LDCs, their governments will find it easier to sell the agreement
at home. In addition, transitional periods are necessary to ease adjust-
ment problems. Several additional possibilities for compromise shall
be introduced in part V, such as the sale of licenses to ex-pirates on
preferential terms.
D. Arguments for and against GA 7T as a Forum for the Protection
of Intellectual Property
1. Competence of GA "T
Several arguments have been made to support the claim that
GATT does not have the competence to take up matters of IP protec-
tion, but there are also important counter-arguments. Authors sup-
porting the developing countries have argued that if IP should be
protected at all, WIPO is the only appropriate forum. To avoid com-
petition between different international organizations, international
law has developed a principle of speciality.196 WIPO conventions are
leges speciales, as they deal specifically with IP. GATT, on the other
hand, is a general agreement on world trade law and is designed to
reduce all kinds of trade barriers. In addition, article 18 of the Paris
Convention shows that this treaty is designed for continous develop-
ment and thus requires that its signatories seek improvement of IP
protection first and foremost within the Convention.
97
However, rules of IP protection, or the lack thereof, can become
non-tariff barriers by which countries circumvent their obligations to
194. See Primo Braga, supra note 108; Gadbaw & Richards have examined the grade of
organization and likely lobbying impact of private sector groups opposing and supporting in-
creased IP protection in key developing countries. See supra note 37, at 112-19 (Argentina), 152-
60 (Brazil), 189-94 (India), 238-44 (Mexico), 276-84 (Korea), 314-19 (Singapore), and 342-47
(Taiwan).
195. See Primo Braga, supra note 108.
196. See Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 115, at 6.
197. See Joos & Moufang, supra note 75, at 896 (citing Kunz-Hallstein).
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reduce tariffs and abolish other protectionist measures. In addition,
many developing countries view IP as part of their general economic
policy, 198 and indeed, IP rules can hardly be separated from industrial
production and trade. There is thus a direct link to the concerns of
the GATT.
Moreover, the lex specialis character of an international agreement
can change over time, particularly if a modifying lex posterior is
adopted by more or less the same group of states. Article 19 of the
Paris Convention explicitly permits the member states to conclude
separate agreements, as long as these do not contradict the Conven-
tion. Such agreements have been concluded in great numbers outside
of WIPO, indicating that WIPO never was intended to be an exclusive
forum for the protection of IP.
It has been claimed that the GATT itself mentions matters of IP
only tangentially and as an external factor, for example in article
XX(d). The original GATT thus would not provide a mandate for the
inclusion of IP. Equally, the Punta del Este Declaration is said to
provide a legal mandate only as far as negotiations on counterfeiting
are concerned. 199
Yet, the fact that GATT itself does not regulate IP to a greater
extent can be explained. First, at the time when the GATT was
drafted, the International Trade Organization (ITO) was supposed to
deal comprehensively with IP in international trade. 20° However, the
ITO never materialized, because between 1948-50, the U.S. Congress
repeatedly refused its consent to the charter establishing the ITO. Sec-
ondly, it was not apparent in 1947 that the existing conventions, later
to be administered by WIPO, would not be able to keep up with tech-
nological development and could instead provide only inadequate
protection.
GATT is essentially a contract, and like every contract it can be
modified by a later agreement of its parties. Under international law,
there is no rule preventing a contract from extending into new areas if
the members so choose. Thus, at least since the Punta del Este and
Montreal Declarations, GATT does have competence to deal with IP.
The claim that the Punta del Este Declaration does not go beyond
counterfeiting is equally wrong. The original text refers to "trade-re-
lated aspects of intellectual property rights, including trade in counter-
feit goods" (emphasis added). Furthermore, the negotiations of a
198. Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Conven-
lence, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 224 (1988).
199. See Primo Braga, supra note 108, at 6.
200. See Joos & Moufang, supra note 75, at 28 (citing Fikentscher).
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draft counterfeiting code during the Tokyo Round can be seen as a
precedent for IP protection within GATT.20 1 In addition, several
other instruments negotiated under GATT auspices and using GATT
procedures and practices deal with IP rights: the 1958 recommenda-
tion on marks of origin, the Customs Valuation Code, and the Stan-
dards Code of the Tokyo Round.20 2 In any case, consultations between
the GATT Director General and the Director General of WIPO have
led to an agreement that there are no jurisdictional reasons not to pro-
ceed with IP in GATT. 20 3 Finally, it has been argued that IP was as
much a matter of culture, politics and development policy, as it was a
matter of trade. As the GATT could deal only with "trade-related"
issues of IP protection, it was thus blind to many of the interests of the
developing countries in protecting their independent cultures against
"Westernization" and enhancing their development interests by pro-
tectionist measures.
Nevertheless, leading NICs/LDCs have meanwhile accepted that
GATT does have jurisdiction in the field, and that the TRIPs group
may negotiate a comprehensive code of all trade-related aspects of IP
rights. This became very clear at the Geneva meeting in April 1989,
where the delegations adopted the following declaration:
4. Ministers agree that negotiations on this subject shall continue in the
Uruguay Round and shall encompass the following issues:
(a) the applicability of the basic principles of the GATT and of rel-
evant international intellectual property agreements or
conventions;
(b) the provision of adequate standards and principles concerning
the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual prop-
erty rights;
(c) the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforce-
ment of trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into ac-
count differences in national legal systems;
(d) the provision of effective and expeditous procedures for the
multilateral prevention and settlement of disputes between gov-
ernments, including the applicability of GATT procedures;
(e) transitional arrangements aiming at the fullest participation in
the results of the negotiations....
7. The negotiations shall also comprise the development of a multilat-
eral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with interna-
tional trade in counterfeit goods.2°4
201. See Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 57, at 43 n.10.
202. See Primo Braga, supra note 108.
203. REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S ADVISORY TRADE PANEL, THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: POLICY PROPOSALS ON TRADE AND SERV-
ICES 63 (Leddy & Reinstein auths. 1987).
204. Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Apr. 11 1989, at 12-13 (emphasis added).
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One problem should not be neglected by the WICs, however. The
inclusion of IP in the GATT would be a considerable expansion of the
competence of GATT. Such an expansion would also set a precedent
in international law. These same arguments might one day be used
against the interests of the WICs, should the developing countries,
with their majority in nearly all international fora, decide to expand
the scope of some other international organization in a direction
favorable to them.
2. Compatibility of a GA IT Code with Existing WIPO Conventions
According to the draft proposals, the standards of a new GATT
code would be higher than those in existing WIPO conventions. A
collision between the two systems in this respect is thus unlikely.
However, certain Western proposals contain a principle of reciprocity,
i.e., a provision stating that IP protection is only granted to a foreigner
if her home state equally protects nationals of the host state. This type
of provision has been attacked as incompatible with the fundamental
principle of national treatment embodied in major WIPO conventions.
It is true that under international law, subsequent treaties between
some but not all members of an earlier treaty cannot interfere with the
rights of those states which are parties only to the earlier treaty.20 5
With respect to the principle of national treatment, this rule requires,
for example, that a state which introduces special procedural rights for
IP owners subsequent to the adoption of a new GATT code must
grant these rights equally to all applicants from states adhering to the
Paris Convention. If these guidelines are observed, conflict between
the WIPO conventions and a GATT code can be avoided. 20 6 In any
case, the possibility of such conflict does not negate the right to negoti-
ate such a code.
3. Duplication of WIPO Efforts
Some authors have claimed that it would be inefficient to repeat in
GATT what has already been done in WIPO.207 Proponents of
GATT have answered that it is probably more efficient to achieve ade-
quate IP protection in GATT than it would be to improve WIPO.
The advantages of GATT over WIPO and the possibility of tying up a
package deal in the Uruguay Round make the latter proposition worth
attempting. In any event, GATT would not have to repeat all the
205. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 30(4), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27
(1969), reprinted at 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
206. See Joos & Moufang, supra note 75, at 29 (citing Fikentscher).
207. Id. at 32.
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work WIPO has done over decades because it can build on those
WIPO results that are generally accepted. Conversely, WIPO can not
only serve as an advisory body to the new GATT protection system, it
can also benefit from those agreements achieved in GATT.
4. Lack of Expertise
It has been argued that GATT will not improve but only balkanize
protection of IP, because it lacks any expertise in the field. WIPO has
been dealing with all aspects of IP protection for more than 22 years.
It employs a permanent staff of some 300 persons from over 52 differ-
ent countries, dealing exclusively with matters of IP. Its international
bureau centralizes all kinds of information related to the protection of
IP, serves as a depository of most of the treaties administered by
WIPO, and maintains four international registration services for pat-
ents, trademarks, industrial designs and appellations of origin.20°
GATT, by contrast, has never addressed matters of IP.
Existing organs like WIPO and the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are naturally reluc-
tant to accept changes that downplay their roles in the field of protec-
tion of IP. However, it is quite unnecessary to view GATT and WIPO
as being in competition with each other. As far as providing adequate
protection of IP as a means of encouraging innovation and creativity,
both organizations will have parallel interests. The ideal solution
would be for, the two entities to cooperate in as many fields as possible.
Some combination of WIPO and GATT would be a considerable ex-
pansion of the competence of GATT. Many countries have already
indicated that they intend to send the same delegates to the negotiat-
ing tables of GATT that have previously participated in WIPO delib-
erations.2°9 If GATT provides the mechanisms for effective dispute
settlement and enforcement, WIPO could offer technical and adminis-
trative services. In dispute settlement under GATT, questions like the
existence or infringement of an IP right should be answered by WIPO
specialists. Independent WIPO experts could even sit on GATT
panels. Thus, although a "marriage of love" between the two organi-
zations is unlikely, a "marriage of convenience" could significantly
further the common cause of protecting IP in world trade. The task
could be split between the two fora, and in accordance with the old
proverb, "cobbler, stick to your last," each part should do what it does
well.
208. See WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 73, at 5, 59.
209. See Joos & Moufang, supra note 75, at 897 (citing U.S. Trade Representative Emery
Simon).
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5. Enforcement
The rules of GATT are not self-executing in the national legal or-
ders of the contracting parties, i.e., they do not give rights and duties
to private individuals but only to the member states.210 The same
principle is planned for rights under a new IP code.21' Existing IP
rights, on the other hand, are created under national laws and are
vested in the individual applicant or juridical entity.212 Traditionally,
the enforcement of IP rights is also done by the private owner, either
in her home country or in the country where the pirate is located.
GATT would add a third alternative: enforcement on the interna-
tional level through GATT dispute settlement procedures.
This may sound better than it actually is. If an importing state
does not adequately protect foreign IP and does not give sufficient pro-
cedural rights to foreign IP owners, the only way of enforcing the
rights would be for the home state of the IP exporter to take up the
matter in GATT. However, private individuals could not force their
home state to do so, and the state might be reluctant to act for polit-
ical, de minimis, or other reasons. In this event, the new GATT code
would be of no help.
An additional problem under GATT would appear when goods
are pirated that have connections to more than one state. An inven-
tion could be made in country A, produced in B, sold in C, and pirated
in X. As private individuals do not have rights under the GATT,
which state should be allowed to take up the matter?213 Arguably, the
best solution would be to allow each state in which the IP is protected
to file the complaint.
6. Domination by Wealthy Industrialized States
Certain developing countries have traditionally mistrusted GATT
and called it a "rich man's club where the interests of the developed
countries generally carry the day."' 214 Even before GATT was cre-
ated, developing countries pushed for special and differential treat-
ment in the ITO negotiations. 215 At first they were not very successful
with these efforts, as the rather limited scope of article XVIII of the
GATT regarding preferences for developing countries shows.
210. See eg., International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,
1972 E.C.R. 1219.
211. See EEC Negotiating Position, Europe Documents No. 1522, at 3 (July 29, 1988).
212. Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 114, at 20 n.32.
213. Id
214. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 57, at 47.
215. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 114 (2d ed. 1986).
1377
Michigan Journal of International Law
Equally, the results of the Kennedy Round did not satisfy the develop-
ing countries on this problem, because little had been done to non-
tariff barriers of which they had complained, and tariff cuts were
mainly on goods of little interest to them.216 Although the Tokyo
Round negotiations brought about the adoption of the so-called "En-
abling Clause," this was at least partly counterbalanced by the "Grad-
uation Clause.
'217
More important, however, is the fact that over the years the vari-
ous multilateral trade negotiation ("MTN") rounds have led to a gen-
eral reduction of all tariffs, significantly reducing the value of special
treatment under Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) programs.
Additionally, the MTN rounds have brought about a situation in
which raw materials are typically subject to low tariff rates in WICs,
simpler manufactured goods (textiles, clothing, etc.) are subject to
high tariff rates, and high-tech goods, as exchanged only between the
WICs, are again subject to low tariff rates. The LDCs cannot at pres-
ent supply sophisticated manufactured goods, and they may never be
able to do so as long as their efforts to build up an industrialized infra-
structure and to generate foreign currency by producing and selling
simpler manufactured goods are rendered futile by the high protective
tariffs of the WICs. Thus, the current design of the tariff schedules
effectively forces developing countries to remain cheap suppliers of
cheap raw materials, by negating their comparative advantage (due to
cheap labor and other factors) in the manufacturing of simple
goods.218 It should not be surprising, therefore, that GATT has been
accused of being a tool of the WICs in their effort to maintain and
entrench their domination over world trade and less developed
nations.
E. West vs South: Conclusions
The economic prosperity of NICs/LDCs that introduce IP protec-
tion is in the best interest of the WICs for several reasons.
216. Id. at 1144; see UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
KENNEDY ROUND ESTIMATED EFFECTS ON TARIFF BARRIERS, U.N. Doc., TD/6/Rev.1
(1968).
217. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNCTAD, ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, sec. 178, 30 U.N. Doc. TD/B/778/Rev.1 (1982). The "Enabling
Clause" allows deviations from the most favored nation principle in favor of developing coun-
tries, but, as the name suggests, it does not require the developed states to introduce these prefer-
ences. The "Graduation Clause," by contrast, introduces a (very vague) limit in time and
economic performance, from which point onward a developing country is no longer eligible to
receive the preferential treatment under the "Enabling Clause."
218. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 215, at 1139.
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First, this would set a precedent for other countries considering
their own introduction of IP protection. Second, many NICs are al-
ready important export markets for the WICs, and the introduction of
IP protection, with its long-term incentives for investment, creativity
and growth, could make them even more attractive. However, this
would be considerably reduced by a recessionary development subse-
quent to improvement of IP protection. Third, Western IP owners
cannot expect many additional royalties if the NICs/LDCs plunge
into a deep recession. Fourth, many NICs/LDCs are important sup-
pliers of raw materials and simpler manufactured goods, and a bad
recession and/or bankruptcy of important firms in one or more sectors
could cut off these supplies to the WICs. Finally, serious economic
difficulties frequently cause political repercussions, which are undesir-
able for world-political and strategic reasons.
For these and other reasons, the WICs should be interested not
only in luring or coercing as many NICs/LDCs as possible into sign-
ing a future GATT code on IP, they should be just as interested in a
smooth and successful transition. Part V, dealing with the question of
how NICs/LDCs can be persuaded to become parties to a GATT
code, will thus focus on meaningful concessions and assistance that
could be offered to NICs/LDCs by the WICs.
V. POSSIBILITIES FOR COMPROMISE
A. Concessions by Western Industrialized Countries
1. Information and Assistance
A look at international trade statistics may encourage the view
that all the WICs have to do to force most of the NICs/LDCs into
concessions on IP is to threaten restrictions in market access for the
products of these countries. However, the economic advantages of lib-
eral access to Western markets are not the only concern of the govern-
ments in NICs/LDCs. In the eyes of their domestic constituents,
"Group of 77" governments frequently meet with more approval if
they resist U.S. and Western pressure, however economically irra-
tional this may be. With this fact in mind, the WICs will achieve more
in the Uruguay Round negotiations if they make substantial and prof-
itable offers which the NIC/LDC leaders can take home with them in
exchange for agreement on IP protection. Such concessions would
help them to save face in the domestic arena. This strategy will ulti-
mately prove more effective than threats.
On the other hand, the price of each concession should be carefully
analyzed, taking into account in particular its long-term effects. The
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optimum level of IP protection for each state depends on its level of
development. When domestic industrial development is only just be-
ginning, a state will usually fare better if it allows liberal access to
foreign IP and does not prohibit or sanction piracy. As domestic in-
dustries grow, they will generate more and more IP of their own-
improvements of foreign IP at first, independent developments later
on-and they will increasingly lobby for protection. Eventually the
state will reach the point where protection of IP becomes more benefi-
cial to it than non-protection, and it will start to protect IP out of its
own self-interest. Arguably, several important NICs, in particular
Taiwan, Brazil and India, are presently very close to this point.
Others, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have passed it and have
introduced IP protection.
The question for the WICs is thus how many concessions should
be offered for something the "major target countries" would do any-
way in a matter of years. Two considerations support the idea that a
GATT IP code is an important step in the right direction and worth a
certain price. First, the more advanced developing countries that will
eventually change sides to become exporters and protectors of IP will
for a long time be replaced by other countries which are a few steps
lower on the ladder of economic development, and which still find it
beneficial to reap easy profits from piracy. A GATT code could place
obligations on these countries before they even begin large-scale
pirating.
Second, IP is not a homogeneous concept. Even if NICs like Bra-
zil and India adopt IP safeguards, they can still leave certain forms of
IP unprotected for a much longer time. This would most likely con-
cern those domestic industries which have not yet achieved significant
improvements and innovations and remain totally dependent on im-
ports of foreign IP. The new technologies discussed in Part I are likely
examples for this tendency. Consistent with this theory, there will al-
ways be areas and technologies which are newly developed in the most
advanced countries, do not fit clearly under existing laws, and which
the other countries' industries would like to obtain as fast and cheaply
as possible. This is why a general code is necessary and worthwhile.
It should not only place obligations on as many countries as possible,
but also be open to new technologies that are not even part of our
imagination today. Otherwise, it might eventually suffer the fate of
the WIPO conventions.
The U.S. is faced with an additional dilemma: within the Western
camp it is the strongest proponent in favor of an IP code. The EC and
Japan might try to "free-ride" on the matter and let the U.S. make the
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bulk of the concessions to be paid in exchange for NIC/LDC
consent. 2
19
If the arguments in favor of better IP protection are as good as
claimed by the WICs, it should be possible to convince a substantial
number of countries simply by explaining all the costs and benefits to
them. Of course, this would have to be done in a credible way; i.e., by
neutral experts applying a country-specific analysis. One possibility
might be to engage large management consulting firms with expertise
in the area to prepare reports, such as on what the ideal IP protection
for the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry should look like.
Developing countries should be offered transition periods in ex-
change for ratification of an IP code. These periods of gradual up-
grading of IP protection would permit them to bring their national
laws into conformity with the new rules and would ease economic dis-
location effects. 220 Reasonable but limited time periods have clear ad-
vantages over the combination of special and differential treatment
with a graduation clause: the time is fixed, there is no further discus-
sion as to when and how graduation takes place, and obligations can
be staggered to require gradual implementation.
Technical and financial assistance for the creation or improvement
of an IP enforcement infrastructure is one of the main concessions that
can be offered without causing problems for other industrial sectors in
the WICs. Three levels of assistance should be considered. 221 On the
international level, GATT and WIPO should cooperate in assisting
the NICs/LDCs. They could provide neutral model laws, training for
lawyers and government officials, and advice for the establishment of
registration offices and courts. On the national level, the governments
of the WICs could support the measures of GATT and WIPO by pro-
viding additional training programs and supplying the financial means
to cover part of the costs of the establishment of the necessary govern-
mental infrastructure.
On the private level, western IP owners could provide industry-
specific aid by facilitating the sale of licenses to the NICs/LDCs, offer-
ing special rebates for "infant industries" and providing assistance
with the worldwide registration of improvement patents of the NICs/
LDCs. After all, since the private IP owners in the WICs are going to
be the main beneficiaries of a new GATT code, they should contribute
their share in concessions, instead of allowing the burden to be borne
219. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 29.
220. IPC/Keidanren/UNICE, supra note 8, at 27.
221. Id.
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solely by such industries as farming and textiles, which will be affected
by other concessions required as part of a successful compromise in
the Uruguay Round.
The issue of technology transfer should be of particular interest to
the NICs/LDCs because increased foreign direct investment not only
provides the developing nations with foreign exchange (through the
investment itself and subsequent increased export earnings), but it also
creates jobs and an industrialized infrastructure.
For years the WICs have been reluctant to agree to any
"mandatory technology transfer below cost" programs, be they in the
framework of the Paris Convention Revision Conference 222 or the de-
bate on a "New Economic World Order" in the UN General Assem-
bly. Realistically, they will not enter into such mandatory programs
now simply because the NICs/LDCs undertake to upgrade their IP
protection. However, there are possible alternatives that should be
considered in the present context. On the governmental level, the
WICs could facilitate private technology transfer by shortening the
COCOM list223 or by providing tax incentives and loan guarantees.
On the private level, the Western IP owners, particularly multina-
tional firms, could accept concrete undertakings to increase invest-
ment and technology transfer, provided a country protects °IP
adequately and has otherwise suitable "ground rules" (stable political
situation, rule of law, repatriation of profits, etc.). U.S. firms could
even commit themselves to invest a certain percentage of the addi-
tional profits they gain from the elimination of piracy.
224
A very ingenious idea was put forth by Gadbaw and Richards,
who suggest that the Western IP owners could actually commit them-
selves to selling licenses to their former enemies, the pirates, at fair
market rates. The WIC governments and possibly even GATT and/
or WIPO could assist in the negotiation of such agreements. Not only
would pirating by these firms effectively be ended, they could still con-
tinue in the same line of business, using their existing know-how, expe-
rience and marketing channels. In addition, the problem of increasing
unemployment subsequent to the introduction of IP protection could
be contained.
222. Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 115, at 2.
223. The Coordination Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was estab-
lished by the WICs in order to control the exportation of strategically sensitive goods to ideologi-
cally problematic countries, primarily in the former Eastern Bloc. In order to reduce the
possibilities for these countries to buy the goods via third parties, a list of goods was established
that may not be exported to any non-Western countries. Thus, the developing countries are
equally denied access to certain technologies.
224. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 27.
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As shown above, the NICs/LDCs will probably suffer net losses
from the introduction of IP protection in the first few years because
the increased royalty transfers will not immediately be outweighed by
the advantages of increased domestic R & D and creativity. This
problem is magnified by the fact that most developing countries al-
ready have problems with foreign exchange and heavy international
debt.
Key opponents of an IP code, such as Brazil, could possibly be
enticed by offers of some kind of a "Brady Plan for IP protection,"
conditioned, of course, on accession to the code. Another alternative
would be increased lending programs for those countries that improve
their IP protection. It is up to the WICs to provide easier access to
World Bank loans for certain countries. 225 Arguably, the WICs would
also experience a net gain by writing off some ailing debts in exchange
for an unconditional and enforceable commitment to improved IP
protection.
2. Special and Differential Treatment in Key Areas
The words "special and differential treatment" carry a negative
connotation in the WICs because this is what the NICs/LDCs have
always demanded: obligations for the WICs only, and special privi-
leges for the developing countries as a means of development aid.
Clearly a two-tiered approach is not appropriate for the GATT code.
After all, this is just what has de facto prevailed under the WIPO con-
ventions, to the detriment of IP rights.
However, "special and differential treatment" can be understood in
a different sense and may prove an attractive lure for the developing
countries. In previous negotiations on IP, the NICs/LDCs have re-
peatedly expressed concern for three particular groups of consumers:
farmers, who require access to cheap seeds, fertilizers and agro-chemi-
cals; ill people, who need reasonably-priced pharmaceuticals; and stu-
dents, who rely on access to cheap educational supplies so that even
low-income people can obtain an education. 226 If the WICs target
these three areas and provide reasonable solutions, they can create
considerable incentives for the NICs/LDCs to join a code on IP. Ex-
amples of such solutions may be the provision on special terms of IP
rights covering educational supplies or the encouragement of direct
investment by manufacturers of agro-chemicals and pharmaceuticals
in these countries, focusing on their particular needs (e.g. anti-malaria
225. See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 114, at 34 n.57.
226. See, e.g., Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 15.
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drugs). Another possibility would be the transfer of technology and
know-how to help manufacturers in the NICs/LDCs produce generic
drugs and other non-protected goods. This kind of special and differ-
ential treatment could be so limited in scope that it does little harm in
the WICs but helps a great deal in the NICs/LDCs. If necessary,
graduation clauses could place time limits on the provisions.
3. Code of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises
In 1976, the OECD declared Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises, which are designed to govern the general behavior of multina-
tional enterprises in different countries, and in particular, to prevent
the abuse of concentrations of economic power.2 27 The Guidelines re-
quire said enterprises to respect the economic and social policies of the
host state, to abstain from improper involvement in political activities
there, to refrain from anticompetitive and predatory behavior against
competitors, to respect tax laws and refrain from evasive practices
such as transfer pricing, and to observe fair and non-discriminatory
employment relations. However, these rules are not binding on the
multinational enterprises, and cannot be enforced against them.
The WICs could build on the OECD Guidelines and draft an im-
proved code with certain mandatory rules, to be offered as a conces-
sion in the Uruguay Round in exchange for adequate IP protection by
NICs/LDCs. Because the multinational enterprises would be the ma-
jor beneficiaries of a GATT code on IP, it would only be fair to require
them to contribute their share in concessions. Refusal to accept bind-
ing obligations as to certain minimum standards would shed a dubious
light on these firms.
In addition to the standards included in the present non-binding
code, multinational enterprises could be obliged to respect the anti-
trust laws of their home state in all their worldwide business activities.
They should not exploit the fact that antitrust enforcement is not yet
developed to the same degree in Third World countries. Furthermore,
the firms should reduce the "brain-drain" effect by refraining from
transferring trained workers and specialists from the subsidiaries in
the NICs/LDCs to their headquarters in their home states. Finally,
the code could also require multinational enterprises to increase
R & D in the developing countries for certain endemic problems, such
as family planning, city planning, agricultural production in tropical
climates, and disease control.
227. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Ac-
TIVITIES OF OECD IN 1976 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.) 99.
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4. Exceptions for the Poorest Countries
Quite a number of the poorest countries could probably be induced
to sign and ratify an IP code by offering them far-reaching or total
exemption from the obligations of that same code. Their exemption
would be conditioned on their signing of the code and could be stag-
gered to attract quick ratification (e.g. 15 years exemption if ratified in
the first year, 10 years if ratified in the second year, and 7 years in the
third year).
This would be a small price for the WICs to pay because the
poorest and least developed countries do not have the potential to do
much harm to foreign IP. The benefits to be gained would be two-
tiered. In the short run, the code would quickly receive a substantial
number of ratifications. In the longer run, these countries would be
subject to code obligations, and the WICs could start helping them
with the installation of "IP-protecting" infrastructures well before the
exemptions run out.
5. Package-Deal with Other Uruguay Round Negotiating Topics
A code on IP cannot be viewed in isolation, without regard to the
other topics of the Uruguay Round, because the leading WICs cer-
tainly have much to gain from it, while most NICs and some LDCs
will suffer at least short-term disadvantages. It is only natural that the
NICs/LDCs are pushing for compensation in the form of Western
concessions on other negotiating topics, such as better import access
for certain developing country products. This expected "package deal
effect" of the Uruguay Round (i.e., the give and take of concessions in
unrelated negotiating topics) seems to be the single greatest source of
hope for all proponents of better IP protection in a GATT side-code.
However, two factors severely limit possible actions by the U.S. gov-
ernment 228 in this respect: the powerful lobbies of the farming, the
textile, and clothing industries, and the U.S. current account deficit.
It has been demanded that the GATT negotiations should be bal-
anced within each negotiating topic. Any agreement on agriculture,
services, IP, etc. should be able to stand on its own.229 This approach
would not only relinquish the package deal advantage; if it is shared
by a majority in Congress and not taken into account sufficiently by
the U.S. negotiators, it could happen that the entire carefully negoti-
ated set of agreements would not be accepted. Valuable improvements
228. Very similar problems arise in the EC and Japan, as to the existence of powerful protec-
tionism in favor of domestic agricultural producers. See S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 33.
229. See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 114, at 38.
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in services, GATT articles, Trade Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS), etc., would then be lost as well,2 30 not to mention the dam-
age to the reputation and credibility of the United States in the inter-
national arena.
As mentioned above, the current account deficit of the U.S. has
grown to frightening dimensions, and strong political forces are push-
ing for protectionist measures as a means of containing the deficit. A
congressional majority in favor of further trade liberalization by grant-
ing better access to developing countries' textiles and agricultural
products will thus be rather unlikely, even amongst those who do not
tradtionally support the concerns of farmers and clothing
manufacturers.
However, trade policy is falsely blamed for the current account
deficit. It is true that the balance of trade has been negative for quite
some time,231 but the overall deficit is caused primarily by the im-
mense transfers of interest payments, which by far exceed the revenue
generated by U.S. investment abroad. 232 The cause of the $500 billion
U.S. foreign debt 233 which requires these interest payments is clearly
not found in trade policy alone. Its main source lies in the continuous
decline of private domestic savings in the U.S., which forces the gov-
ernment to seek foreign capital to finance the budget deficit. There is
thus a missing link in the argumentation of protectionists: no matter
how protectionist trade policy becomes, it cannot remedy the lack of
domestic savings.
Concerning the liberalization of world agricultural trade, five dif-
ferent positions have been taken by the various negotiators. First, the
U.S. has proposed the gradual elimination of all subsidies234 and all
230. Id. at 27.
231. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 15, 1989, at 18. The deficit in the balance of
trade had been 27.7 billion dollars in the first quarter of 1989. See also supra notes 169-71.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. GATi art. XVI(3) is an exception to the general prohibition of export subsidies in favor
of "primary products [as long as they are not] applied in a manner which results in that con-
tracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product ......
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. A GATT panel has defined "primary products" as products
of farm, forest or fishery "in its natural form or which has undergone [only] such processing as is
customarily required to prepare it for marketing.., in international trade." (The Pasta Case,
GATT Doc. SCM/43, reprinted in J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 215, at 740). The
concept of "equitable share of world export trade" is even harder to define. Eight panels have
dealt with complaints against EC production and export subsidies which have contributed to
transform the Community from a net importer to one of the world's largest exporters. Four
panels adopted reports and none of them found a causal link between the subsidies and the
increase in the share of world export trade. Guth & Hartwig, .4rarhandelspolitik im GA 77"-
Erfahrungen im Hinblick auf die Uruguay Runde, 43 EUROPA-ARCHiv 533, 535 (1988).
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other measures which encourage production within ten years. After
this period, only production-neutral income support schemes should
be permissible.235 This proposal not only far exceeds the negotiating
mandate of the Ministerial Declaration of September 1986,236 it would
hardly find the necessary support when presented to the Senate. In
truth, the proposal is part of a negotiating strategy of demanding so
much that a compromise between this extreme and the opposite ap-
proach of leaving things unchanged would still be viewed as a signifi-
cant liberalization.
Second, the EC proposal is almost diametrically in opposition. In
short, the EC has proposed to maintain the present system of domestic
and export subsidization, merely putting a ceiling on the level of per-
mitted production-encouraging subsidies.237 On the one hand, the gi-
gantic overproduction of numerous agricultural products in recent
years, which is all bought by the EC from farmers at intervention
prices and put into storage, has created financial difficulties that have
begun to threaten the functioning of the entire Common Market. This
suggests that the EC proposal, like that of the U.S., is just being used
as a tactic. On the other hand, EC farmers are on average so much
smaller and less efficient than their American, Canadian, and Austra-
lian competitors that the American proposal will remain totally unac-
ceptable. A certain readiness to start a gradual replacement of the
current production support by income support can be found,
however. 2
38
Third, in August 1986, delegations from 14 countries239 met in
Cairns, Australia, and formed the "Fair Traders in Agriculture" or
"Cairns Group." These countries are united by the fact that they all
have large agricultural production capacities and small domestic mar-
kets, and thus are net exporters of practically all their agricultural
products. 24° The Cairns Group has made a proposal in the Uruguay
Round similar to that of the U.S. (elimination of all import barriers
235. See Guth & Hartwig, supra note 234, at 540; S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 30.
236. The Punta del Este Declaration (GAT" Press Release No. 1396, Sept. 25, 1986, re-
printed in S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 65,) does not include harmonization of health and
phytosanitary regulations, for example.
237. See Guth & Hartwig, supra note 234, at 541.
238. See S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 32. After the Houston Summit and the Geneva GATT
Conference of last July, the EC has finally tabled concrete figures. According to Commissioner
MacSharry, the EC is willing to reduce its overall subsidization of agricultural production by
30% in the ten-year period of 1986-1996. Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung, August 1, 1990, at 10.
239. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand and Uruguay.
240. Eg., Australia exports 60% of its wheat, 50% of its beef and 90% of its sugar produc-
tion. Guth & Hartwig, supra note 234, at 540.
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and all direct or indirect export subsidies by the year 2000), but with a
few important exceptions in favor of structural adjustment programs
and various production-neutral programs. 24' This proposal is interest-
ing for two reasons: first, it seems to be a realistic compromise between
the U.S. and the EC proposals; and second, several countries in the
Cairns Group are among the "major target countries" of the IP nego-
tiations. The U.S. and the EC could approach the proposal of the
Cairns Group from different sides and condition their "giving-in" or
support in the question of IP by certain members of the Cairns Group,
particularly Brazil and Argentina.
Fourth, several industrialized countries are net importers of practi-
cally all agricultural products. 242 In contrast to the above groups,
they have no exporting ambitions and are in effect benefitting from the
worldwide subsidized surplus production. Their proposals do not aim
at significant liberalization in world trade, but rather at maintenance
of their systems of import barriers which protect their small domestic
production.243 These protectionist goals are thinly veiled, such as by
claiming a need for national self-sufficiency for security reasons
(Japan).244
Fifth, Jamaica attempted to unite the remaining developing coun-
tries,245 but failed to do so.2 46 The interests in this large group of
countries are too diverse to allow for a united position. Most of these
countries are not very large exporters of agricultural goods; some are
pushing more for an agreement on tropical products; others benefit
from GSP status for their few export products.
Textiles are matters of central interest to most of those developing
countries that are not in the Cairns Group. In order to draw them
into a comprehensive package deal including an adequate IP code, this
issue will have to be addressed. However, Gadbaw and Gwynn claim
that the textile lobby in the U.S. is even better organized and more
politically powerful than the proponents of IP, which means that con-
cessions in the textile sector to buy an agreement on IP may endanger
the ratification of the entire package deal, once it is placed before
Congress.2
47
241. Id. at 541.
242. Austria, Finland, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
243. See Guth & Hartwig, supra note 234, at 541.
244. See S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 31. The Japanese opposition to rice imports, the eco-
nomic size of the rice market there and the first signs for an opening of the market were recently
described in THE ECONOMIST, July 28, 1990, at 70.
245. Several NICs are in this group, most notably India.
246. Guth & Hartwig, supra note 234, at 540.
247. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 57, at 67.
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Textiles and clothing are not subject to GATT rules. They are
covered by the so-called "Multifibre Agreement" (MFA), a combina-
tion of quotas and voluntary export restraint agreements. These meas-
ures limit market access of textile manufacturers in developing
countries when selling to WICs. The Punta del Este Declaration calls
for negotiations to permit the eventual integration of this sector into
the GATT. The present MFA expires in 1991; however, the EC and
the U.S. have already indicated that they are seeking liberalization
"within existing agreements"-i.e., they will attempt to renegotiate
the MFA after its expiration.248 This would not only perpetuate ineffi-
cient industrial structures in the WICs, it would give away an impor-
tant bargaining chip of the IP negotiators, and it would continue a
system under which the NICs/LDCs have little chance of increasing
their export earnings, broadening their industrial base, and eventually
improving their overall economic situation.
Negotiations on further tariff cuts should focus on the complaint
that the tariff structures of the WICs are entrenching the present situa-
tion in which the NICs/LDCs are not much more than suppliers of
cheap raw materials. The Punta del Este Declaration placed an em-
phasis on the extension of tariff bindings to currently unbound prod-
ucts. However, most WICs already have very comprehensive tariff
schedules, while countries like Brazil and South Korea still have virtu-
ally uncontrolled tariff regimes. Not pushing this issue too much
could thus be used to induce Brazil to agree to concessions on IP.
In addition, tariff cuts will frequently not be in the best interest of
the developing countries because they erode the advantages of the
GSP. Therefore, the WICs should not seek tariff reductions on typical
GSP products, extend GSP to more products, and implement signifi-
cant tariff cuts on non-GSP products to elicit agreement from the de-
veloping countries on IP protection.
The Punta del Este Declaration directs the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations to seek the fullest liberalization of trade in tropical products, in
both their processed and semiprocessed forms, covering tariffs and
non-tariff barriers. 249 By the time of the midterm review at the minis-
terial level (December 1988 at Montreal, Canada), an agreement on
tropical products was ready for signature. However, the U.S. condi-
tioned its consent to reduce tariffs on 49 tropical products by 25%
upon successful negotiations in other major sectors, primarily agricul-
ture and IP. A large number of tropical products are agricultural in
248. S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 40.
249. S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 39.
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nature, which provides a link between these topics. Moreover, an
"early harvest" in tropical products would have given away part of the
negotiating strength of the WICs. 25
0
Safeguards are measures of special protection for industries seri-
ously injured or threatened by increasing lawful imports. This may be
the only area where India has expressed a strong interest in obtaining
certain concessions from the WICs. At the midterm review, India and
a few other developing countries demanded that safeguard actions
should be limited in duration, adopted on a non-discriminatory MFN
basis, and applied only in the form of increased tariffs and then only
after determination of persistent serious injury by an international sur-
veillance body. "Gray area" measures that could circumvent these
rules should be proscribed.251 With the possible exception of the inter-
national surveillance body, all these demands are realistic and proba-
bly acceptable to the WICs if the NICs/LDCs make concessions in IP
and other areas in exchange.
Dispute settlement is not only an area where all countries agree
that improvements should be made, it is also a testing ground for the
fairness and sincerity of the WICs. While powerful trading nations
like the U.S., the EC, or Japan can enforce their rights by applying
trade sanctions against other countries, smaller economic powers lack
the clout and the economic and diplomatic skills to do so. They have
to rely on mechanisms like the GATT dispute settlement procedure if
their rights are violated. Surprisingly, they have not yet made dispute
settlement one of their priorities.
At the midterm review, consensus was reached on certain meas-
ures to improve the dispute settlement system.252 Time limits should
be applied at all stages of the process to avoid delay tactics by the
accused party. A flexible arbitration mechanism should be offered as
an alternative to the normal dispute settlement process. All con-
tracting parties should have an automatic right to a panel, unless the
Council reaches a consensus to act otherwise. Standardized terms of
reference should be drafted for the selection of the panelists and the
settlement procedure. Finally, there should be a fifteen-month dead-
line for the completion of dispute settlement.
The implementation of adopted panel reports should be more
strictly enforced. Up to now the only way for the successful complain-
250. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, URUGUAY ROUND UPDATE 5 (Jan. 1989). The
decisions adopted at the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round are reproduced at 28 I.L.M.
1023 (1989).
251. S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 34-36.
252. U.S. DEPARMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 250, at 5.
1390 [Vol. 11:1317
Summer 1990] Intellectual Property In The Uruguay Round
ant to enforce a panel report was to cancel some of its own concessions
on a non-MFN basis, i.e., impose restrictions on imports from the
other country. This system works when two equal partners like the
EC and the U.S. threaten each other with meaningful sanctions, but
the threat is not likely to be taken seriously when made by a develop-
ing country against an economic giant.
253
Obviously, the WICs could offer more in this area; at a minimum,
the Canadian suggestion that voting on panel reports should be done
by "consensus minus two" should be formally adopted.254 The final
goal for one of the next multinational trade rounds should be the in-
troduction of automatically binding panel reports, modeled after the
rules of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement.
Although these numerous possibilities for concessions are but ex-
amples from some of the fifteen negotiating groups, it becomes clear
that the Uruguay Round offers substantial opportunities for compro-
mise. The trade interests of each major opponent of improved IP pro-
tection should be carefully analyzed. As this brief sketch
demonstrates, all opponents have some stake in some of the other
trade matters. Well-aimed offers to these countries, conditioned upon
cooperation in IP, could secure sufficient support and isolate the hard-
liners according the principle of divide et impera.
However, the less is done in the U.S. to fix the current account
deficit and the trade deficit, the less that can be offered in the Uruguay
Round in trade liberalization. If the price to be paid for a package
deal is too high to pass through Congress, the Executive Branch can
still reach the goal of increased protection of IP by putting more em-
phasis on the other "baits" discussed above, not all of which require
the "advice and consent of the Senate."
B. Threats by Western Industrialized Countries
Besides concessions, the WICs also have a number of coercive
measures and threats at their disposal to persuade the NICs/LDCs to
accept improved IP protection.
1. Problems with Sanctions in General
One concern regarding the use of threats has already been men-
tioned: they can be totally ineffective if a government simply refuses to
be perceived as giving in to Western pressure even against its own best
253. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 215, at 1153-54.
254. The EC and Japan have strongly opposed this, stressing compromise and conciliation in
contrast to a more rule-based procedure. S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 48-49.
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interest. In such a case, the world trading system might suffer under
sanctions that have no beneficial effect whatsoever.
Another general problem with sanctions is that they usually hit the
wrong people. The modest and fragile economic prosperity of a coun-
try may be destroyed and development retarded by years, causing
losses and suffering for all consumers, while the pirating industries
continue their covert production and sale in the world markets. The
political leaders responsible for the refusal to provide IP protection
will always be the last to suffer personally from a recession.
Military and geopolitical considerations may prohibit sanctions
against certain major pirating countries. For example, Taiwan and
Hong Kong, as neighbors of the People's Republic of China, may find
it politically difficult to apply sanctions against the latter for violations
of IP laws.
If sanctions violate obligations under GATT or the WIPO treaties,
they will weaken these international systems and sabotage the U.S.'
credibility and reputation in world politics. This might have immedi-
ate impact with respect to other Uruguay Round negotiating topics.
In addition, it will be hard to achieve concerted action by all OECD
members or at least the U.S., the EC and Japan, which would make
the use of sanctions much less viable. Unilateral measures by the U.S.
will only be effective in those areas where other countries like the EC
and Japan cannot fill the gaps left by U.S. withdrawal.
2. Sanctions that Do Not Violate the GA TT
The GSP system was implemented in the period between the Ken-
nedy and the Tokyo Round in 1971. It is based on the "Enabling
Clause," essentially a waiver to article I of the GATT, and grants
duty-free access to goods from developing countries. Certain coun-
tries and goods can be excluded. Roughly twenty OECD countries are
participating in the program. 255 As the term "enabling clause" sug-
gests, there is no obligation to grant GSP status; thus, the WICs are
not prohibited from terminating or reducing it. In particular, Taiwan,
Korea, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Brazil benefit considerably from U.S.
GSP.25 6 India gains more from Japanese and EC GSP schemes.
257 If
the OECD countries could agree on substantial reductions,258 this
255. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 215, at 1156 and J.JACKSON, supra note 152.
256. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supro note 215, at 1158; Gadbaw & Richards, supra note
37, at 24.
257. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 215, at 1158.
258. The U.S. government has the authority to condition GSP treatment on adequate protec-
tion of IP since the 1984 amendment of the Tariff Act of 1930; the EC Commission can do the
same under its New Commercial Instrument. See infra note 266.
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would be a very powerful incentive for the NICs/LDCs to improve
their IP protection.
The WICs could also implement laws to prevent direct investment
by high-tech industries in any of the "major target countries."
Chances for a concerted action by substantially all OECD countries
would be small, however. In addition, such a measure might conflict
with an agreement to be achieved in the TRIMS negotiations.
As a supplementary means, the WICs could promote divestment
by high-tech industries from the most notorious of the pirating coun-
tries. However, this might cause major political repercussions and
poison the international climate for some time to come. In any event,
chances for obtaining the support of the EC and Japan are slim be-
cause the governments of these countries often oppose the condition-
ing of development aid and investment upon political goodwill.
Encouraging multinational enterprises to invest strategically in
those NICs/LDCs where IP is comparably well-protected would be an
alternative that is less politically volatile and equally effective. The
WICs could agree to terminate export credit guarantees, tax breaks
and the like for investments in any of the "major target countries." It
is very unlikely, however, that measures of this kind would have any
immediate effects. Investment decisions are not taken ad hoc, and for
long-term planning of entrepreneurs other location factors may be
overriding. Nevertheless, a general p~olicy of this kind, as long as com-
patable with the future TRIMS agreement, could send a message to
the countries concerned.
Although import quotas are generally prohibited under article
XIII of the GATT, an exception could be justified by the general ex-
ception of article XX(d) ("necessary to secure compliance with [do-
mestic] laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of [the GATT]"). However, there would be a problem in
enforcing these measures, because customs is already unable to iden-
tify all or most infringing products. The exclusion of all products
from a country would be disproportionate, i.e., not "necessary" within
the meaning of article XX(d). Moreover, it could be circumvented by
transshipping through other countries.
National laws in the WICs could be amended to include stiffer
penalties for those domestic enterprises that knowingly and deliber-
ately deal in pirated products, in an effort to dry up the domestic dis-
tribution channels of these products. However, it will remain difficult
to identify these dealers and prove their knowledge of the
infringement.
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Under article XXXV of GATT, the WICs could opt out of mem-
bership with every new applicant if the country does not ratify the new
IP code at the same time as the application to GATT membership
becomes effective. Since the beginning of the Uruguay Round, several
countries have applied for membership,259 and if this trend continues,
the WICs might have an effective means of bringing new members in
line with IP obligations. A membership in GATT without relations
with the U.S., the EC, Japan, and the rest of the OECD countries
should be of little interest to the applicants.
Instead of violating the GATT by unilateral action, the U.S. could
bring the problem before a GATT panel, claiming that failure to pro-
tect IP has the effect of nullifying or impairing benefits accruing to the
U.S. from previous trade liberalization and demand rebalancing of
concessions. 26° Especially in the case of India, the U.S. might be suc-
cessful with such a tactic, because India substantially reduced its pro-
tection of patents in 1970.261 This could well be seen as an act of
deliberate nullification and impairment within the meaning of article
XXIII of the GATT.
Since 1967, it is possible to sue another state before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice for violating the Paris Convention. However,
as stated earlier, there have as yet been no such cases. 262 Countries
seem to consider IP rights to be too trivial and regard a suit brought to
the ICJ an unfriendly act against'the defendant. However, a verdict
by the ICJ would certainly contribute in convincing certain opposing
countries of the fact that IP is a right of the innovator that deserves
protection. The U.S. could pick a particularly notorious pirating
country and bring such a suit before the ICJ, provided the country has
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
Two problems exist, however. First, there is no precedent to such
a case and thus the result would be uncertain. There is a chance that
the Court would hold that there is no infringement if a country has
very low standards of IP protection, as long as it observes the principle
of national treatment embodied in the Paris Convention. Second,
given the manner in which it dealt with the Nicaragua case, the U.S. is
still faced with a tarnished reputation at The Hague.
259. Costa Rica, Paraguay, El Salvador, Venezuela and Bolivia. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Aug. 7, 1989, at 9.
260. See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 37, at 30.
261. See supra note 142.
262. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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3. Sanctions that Violate the Letter and/or the Spirit of GA IT
The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,263 contains four provisions by which the
U.S. can enforce. trade sanctions against violators of IP: section 301,
"Special 301,''264 "Super 301"265 and section 337. Under these provi-
sions, the U.S. government is given the authority to withdraw any
trade agreement concessions, impose tariffs and non-tariff barriers on
goods and services, negotiate understandings with the foreign country,
exclude goods from entry into the U.S., and issue cease and desist or-
ders that can be enforced by fines. The EC Commission has similar
powers under the "New Commercial Instrument. ' '266
Clearly, the withdrawal of trade agreement concessions would vio-
late these agreements unless they provide for an exception. The impo-
sition of higher tariffs and of non-tariff barriers would violate the
GATT, as would the exclusion of goods if these goods themselves are
not infringing IP rights. Thus, the legality of all of the above measures
is at least very doubtful. However, United States Trade Representa-
tive Carla Hills has indicated that the U.S. is prepared, if necessary, to
face and disregard a possible GATT panel ruling on the matter.267
This "gunboat diplomacy" approach could do substantial damage
to the entire GATT system, and in particular it could destroy the
goodwill towards new MTN agreements in the Uruguay Round. If
the U.S. so flagrantly disregards its existing obligations, it cannot ex-
pect different behavior from other countries. And it cannot expect
other nations to believe that in the future a GATT dispute settlement
procedure (in general and in the IP code) would be unbiased, protect
weaker members against illegal coercive measures by the economic su-
perpowers, and result in rulings enforceable even against the U.S.
Another strategy of the U.S. is the introduction of reciprocity
clauses in its national IP protection laws. These clauses result in the
refusal of IP protection to applicants if their home countries do not
protect U.S. applicants. This strategy was first used in the SCPA 268
263. See supra note 97.
264. Special 301 will be an annual process to identify countries with particular problems in
the protection of IP, which come under Sec. 301 and affect just one specific industry or firm.
265. Super 301 will take place only in 1989 and 1990. It is a procedure to identify countries
with generally unfair trade practices, which might come under Sec. 301 and affect all kinds of
industries.
266. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84 of 17 September 1984, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 252) 1 (1984).
267. Oversight of the Trade Act of 1988: Hearing Before the Senate Comm on Finance, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1989) (Statement of Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative).
268. See supra note 52.
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with considerable success. Not only have Japan and the member
states of the EC subsequently enacted semiconductor protection laws,
but quite a number of countries also have immediately upgraded their
protection and applied for reciprocity. 269
As semiconductors were not covered by any WIPO conventions,
the SCPA reciprocity clause does not violate U.S. obligations of grant-
ing national treatment under WIPO.27° Attempts by the U.S. to apply
the same strategy in other areas of IP rights should take into account
that the reciprocity principle conflicts with the WIPO conventions' ob-
ligation to apply national treatment if the technology is covered by
them.27 1 Moreover, GATT requires general national treatment by all
national laws and regulations in article III. It seems rather doubtful
whether article XX(d) could be claimed as an exception for reciprocity
clauses. After all, it reads "laws... not inconsistent with this Agree-
ment," of which most favored nation and national treatment are the
guiding principles.
While reciprocity clauses may seem justified and their quick suc-
cess in the case of the SCPA invites further use, the conflict with ex-
isting obligations would undermine the effectiveness and credibility of
these existing systems. And as this article has demonstrated, there are
other means of obtaining the goal of improved protection for western
IP which do not have these undesirable side effects.
A number of measures could be thought of in areas not directly
related to IP and trade. For example, the WICs could discourage
tourism to "major target countries, ' 27 2 restrict access for their airlines,
or restrict trade in services, such as for Southeast Asian construction
firms. The impact of these measures may be small, however. In addi-
tion, they once again hit the wrong people in the target country and
negatively affect the consumers in the WICs.
As a last resort, it has been suggested that the WICs could create a
"Super GATT of like-minded trading nations. ' 273 Abandonment of
the GATT and formation of a completely new treaty would not only
tie up all the existing side codes in one document, but would also clar-
ify the organizational uncertainties of the existing GATT, thus effect-
ing something like a rebirth of the ITO. The drafting would require
substantial time and effort, but in the long run it might be worthwhile.
269. See Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 57, at 50.
270. However, WIPO adopted the Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Re-
spect of Integrated Circuits on May 26, 1989. See 28 LL.M. 1477 (1989).
271. See Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 115, at 11.
272. This would particularly hit Mexico and, to a lesser degree, India.
273. R. BENKO, supra note 4, at 48.
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A carefully drafted treaty could eliminate the problems currently
plaguing the GATT and could vest more powers in the dispute settle-
ment panels, including the power of progressive interpretation of the
treaty as possessed by the European Court of Justice.
Initially, membership in such an organization would probably be
limited to the major OECD countries. The other GATT member
states would likely cling to the old GATT, but without the financial
support and participation of the WICs, it would soon deteriorate to
the level of UNCTAD and similar organizations. After some time, the
more advanced of the non-OECD members would probably lead the
way in applying for membership in the new organization.
Although the suggestion sounds very tempting, serious problems
should not be overlooked. The WICs are far from agreement in many
important areas of the present trading system. Even if NICs/LDCs
are excluded from the negotiating table, disagreement between the
WICs could suffice to prevent substantial improvement in a new code.
Should the lowest common denominator again require empty compro-
mise formulas, the whole enterprise would not be worth the effort.
In addition, the possible transitional effects on the world economy
are not entirely foreseeable. For example, a serious worldwide reces-
sion could be triggered. Worse still, the use of force would not be
entirely impossible, if economic problems threw countries into tur-
moil. It should not be forgotten that one of the major goals of the
founding fathers of the GATT was to reduce tensions in international
relations by providing a fair and open trading system under which
each state could achieve the goals of a high level of employment, bal-
ance-of-payments equilibrium and lasting economic prosperity. Aban-
donment of the GATT in favor of an uncertain future agreement
should, therefore, remain the very last resort, if used at all. As a
threat to the developing countries, it is not very credible for the same
reasons.
Finally, it is interesting to note, during the preparations of the
Uruguay Round, to the general surprise of all participants, the Soviet
Union expressed an interest in taking part in the negotiations and pos-
sibly even membership in the GATT. At that time, the overture met
with a cool response by the EC and the U.S.274 Things have since
begun to change in the Soviet Union, however. If the process of re-
form towards a more market-oriented economy continues, the Soviet
Union may eventually become an interesting candidate for GATT
274. S. GOLT, supra note 99, at 16.
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membership. 275 The WICs could use this development in their effort
to obtain improved protection of IP by demanding that the USSR first
join the new code on IP. This would not be easy for the Soviet Union,
given its still-communist model of ownership, but it might agree in
order to remove an obstacle on the way towards eventual full member-
ship. If successful, ratification by the Soviets would be a powerful sig-
nal to all countries which presently claim that IP is a purely Western
imperialist concept and foreign to their culture.
VI. CONCLUSION
The protection of IP is essentially a balancing of interests. Several
contradictory goals have to be taken into account. First, there is no
better way of encouraging innovation and creativity than to allow the
innovator the exclusive exploitation of her product, process or service
for a limited time. All other approaches fail to generate the highest
possible degree of just the right innovations. Governmentally financed
R & D (the socialist model) will often generate innovations that are
either not sufficiently useful or obtained at a price which the market
would not have paid for them. It is just not possible to centrally plan
ahead the inventions and creations to be made within the next five-
year plan. Pure market forces, on the other hand, are equally ineffec-
tive. Protection via trade secrets misses the advantages of disclosure.
In addition they favor large and powerful companies over small busi-
nesses and individual inventors. Second, there are the interests of the
consumers. If inventors have unlimited monopoly power, they will
extract much higher returns from their innovations than necessary and
justified.
To reconcile these goals, existing IP laws do not grant unlimited
monopolies. Limitations exist within the IP laws in respect of time.
Provisions for compulsory licensing or even forfeiture of a right pro-
tect against abuse by the owner and compitition laws curb the power
of the largest firms. If and only if this fragile balance of interests is
carefully and even-handedly managed, will the potential for creativity
and innovation in each individual country be fully utilized.
However, the important WIPO conventions date back to the 19th
century and although they have been revised occasionally, they have
failed to meet the challenges posed by the increasingly interdependent
First and Third World with their conflicting interests and to keep up
with the development of radically different technologies. After futile
275. The GATT Council agreed on an observer status for the USSR on May 16, 1990.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 17, 1990, at 16.
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attempts to negotiate improvements within WIPO and faced by rap-
idly increasing financial losses of western IP owners, the WICs are
now disillusioned with WIPO and have turned to the GATT.
As long as the West owns the bulk of all IP rights, it can o:ily gain
from a binding GATT code with stricter standards. At the same time,
there can be no doubt that on a short- to medium-term basis NICs and
LDCs can profit from pirating. As long as their industries do not cre-
ate significant amounts of IP (in comparison with the foreign IP they
are using) and the world economy and trading system as such does not
break down or is hurled into a bad recession, the benefit derived from
cheap access to modern technology outweighs the losses in own crea-
tivity and innovation. World welfare may be reduced, but the individ-
ual country can profit for a certain time until its economic
development has achieved a level where it becomes more beneficial to
protect IP than to pirate it.
Politicians from the developed nations may call this pirating, self-
ish, or theft, but in a world of sovereign nations it has to remain up to
each state to define its policies. However, the WICs do have means to
influence the decision-making process in the NICs/LDCs: Protection-
ism and other threats and/or financial offers and other "bait" can
change a state's attitude as to what is beneficial to it.
Further results of this research are the fact that concessions will be
more effective than threats. Secondly, as IP protection will be benefi-
cial to all more advanced and newly industrialized countries in the
mid- to long run, in many cases adequate and unbiased information
should suffice to win a country for the GATT code. This would be
coercion-free, GATT-conforming and almost cost-neutral. Of course,
protectionist trade embargos or punitive tariffs are easier in applica-
tion and more populistic in the local media and constituency, but who
said that the easiest way is always the best?
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